The Effects of Welfare and
IDA Program Rules on the
Asset Holdings of LowIncome Families
Karin Martinson
M C K ERNAN

S IGNE -M ARY
C AROLINE R ATCLIFFE
Y UNJU N AM
S EPTEMBER 2007

The Urban
Institute

Center for Social
Development

The New
America
Foundation

The Effects of Welfare and IDA Program Rules
on the Asset Holdings of Low-Income Families

A Report in the Series
Poor Finances: Assets and Low-Income Households

September 2007

Signe-Mary McKernan
Caroline Ratcliffe
The Urban Institute
and
Yunju Nam
Center for Social Development
Washington University in St. Louis

This report was prepared for and funded by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,
Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation (DHHS/ASPE) under Order
Number GS23F8198H / HHSP233200400131U to the Urban Institute and its collaborators at the
Center for Social Development (CSD) at Washington University in St. Louis, and the New
America Foundation. This report was prepared between September 2004 and July 2007. John
Tambornino, Linda Mellgren, and Jeremías Alvarez at DHHS were project officers, Signe-Mary
McKernan of the Urban Institute was overall project director, and Michael Sherraden directed
the work at CSD. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent official positions
of the Department of Health and Human Services, the Urban Institute, its trustees, or its
sponsors.

Acknowledgments
The report has benefited from helpful comments and suggestions from Jeremías Alvarez, Alana
Landy, Gretchen Lehman, Ann McCormick, Linda Mellgren, Don Oellerich and Canta Pian of
ASPE and John Tambornino of the Administration for Children and Families/DHHS. William
Margrabe at the Urban Institute provided excellent research assistance.
This report is part of a series entitled Poor Finances: Assets and Low-Income
Households, produced in a partnership between the Urban Institute, Center for Social
Development, and New America Foundation. We thank the team members at the Center for
Social Development and New America Foundation for their positive and productive partnership.

ii

CONTENTS

Introduction to the Series ............................................................................................................. iv
Why Assets Are Important...................................................................................................... v
Income and Assets in Public Policy........................................................................................ v
Asset Policy for Low-Income Households ............................................................................ vi
Executive Summary ....................................................................................................................... 1
Key Findings ........................................................................................................................... 2
Conclusions............................................................................................................................. 3
I. Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1
II. Background ............................................................................................................................... 2
III. Literature ................................................................................................................................. 4
Effect of Means-Tested Program Rules on Asset Holdings .................................................. 4
Why Empirical Analyses May Not Find an Effect of Asset Tests on Asset Holdings......... 5
Effect of IDA Program Rules on Asset Holdings ................................................................... 7
IV. Study Population...................................................................................................................... 8
V. Data............................................................................................................................................ 9
Survey of Income and Program Participation ....................................................................... 9
IDAs.......................................................................................................................................... 13
EITC and Minimum Wage .................................................................................................... 16
VI. Methodology........................................................................................................................... 17
VII. Results................................................................................................................................... 19
Empirical Results, Liquid Asset Holdings ............................................................................ 19
Empirical Results, Vehicle Ownership ................................................................................. 24
Empirical Results, Net Worth................................................................................................ 27
Empirical Results, Years since the Program Rule Was Implemented............................... 29
VIII. Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 30
IX. References .............................................................................................................................. 32
X. Appendix Tables ...................................................................................................................... 34
XI. Appendix: Program Rules Data Documentation.................................................................. 42

iii

Poor Finances:
Assets and Low-Income Households
INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES

Economic security throughout the life course is intrinsically linked to both income and asset
ownership. The majority of current social policies focus primarily on income supports and social
services. However, building assets can also help individuals, families, and communities expand
their economic horizons.
America has a longstanding history of promoting ownership, as reflected in existing
policies to promote home and business ownership, investment, and saving. New opportunities for
people to save and become asset owners will likely increase the number of individuals and
families able to build assets and improve the economic security of all Americans. Greater
inclusivity and accessibility of traditional approaches to expanding ownership may make it easier
for lower and middle income families to save. Still, while theory and evidence suggest that
improved asset-based policies may promote development of low-income individuals and
families, and perhaps communities and society as a whole, research in this area of asset
development is in its infancy. There is still much to learn.
Poor Finances: Assets and Low-Income Households is a series of reports on poverty,
asset building, and social policy. The purpose of the series is to assess the nascent state of
knowledge and policy development and to synthesize recent progress in these areas. Specifically,
the reports in the series will
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

evaluate what is known regarding the measures, distributions, determinants, and effects
of asset holding;
develop a portrait of the assets of low-income households;
develop conceptual frameworks for viewing assets and liabilities;
assess the strengths and weaknesses of data sources on assets and liabilities;
chart directions for future research;
examine the effects of means-tested program policies on asset building; and
inform subsequent discussions of public policy.

While this series of reports focuses on asset accumulation and asset-based policies for
low-income individuals and families, the conceptual frameworks developed are not limited to
low-income populations. This broad approach is an effective way to identify the overall critical
issues that relate to asset holding for all populations. Where appropriate, however, various
reports point out when the framework specifically applies to low-income, minority, and singleparent households. This distinction is important because these subgroups are particularly
vulnerable to low asset accumulation. The definition of low-income used in the series of reports
is necessarily imprecise. The reports reflect a broad literature synthesis, and definitions of low
iv

income are not uniform across studies, surveys, or public programs. However, low incomes can
be broadly thought of as affecting households in the bottom income quintiles.
This report, “The Effects of Welfare and IDA Program Rules on the Asset Holdings of
Low-Income Families,” examines the effects of a comprehensive set of 13 welfare, Food Stamp,
individual development account (IDA), earned income tax credit (EITC), and minimum wage
program rules on the asset holdings of low-education single mothers and families. Low education
was used as a proxy for low income to address fluctuations in income over time. This report
finds empirical evidence of an association between asset limits and IDA program rules and the
asset holdings of low-education single mothers and families.
Why Assets Are Important
In describing why assets are important, it is useful to begin by distinguishing income from assets.
Incomes are flows of resources. They are what people receive as a return on their labor or use of
their capital, or as a public program transfer. Most income is spent on current consumption.
Assets are stocks of resources. They are what people accumulate and hold over time. Assets
provide for future consumption and are a source of security against contingencies. As
investments, they also generate returns that generally increase aggregate lifetime consumption
and improve a household’s well-being over an extended time horizon.
The dimensions of poverty, and its relative distribution among different social classes, are
significantly different when approached from an assets perspective, as opposed to an income
perspective. Those with a low stock of resources to draw on in times of need are asset poor. This
asset poverty may leave them vulnerable to unexpected economic events and unable to take
advantage of the broad opportunities a prosperous society offers. Many studies have found that
the rate of asset poverty exceeds the poverty rate as calculated by the traditional measure, which
is based on an income standard. Many U.S. households have little financial cushion to sustain
them in the event of a job loss, illness, or other income shortfall. Also, social and economic
development of these households may be limited by a lack of investment in education, homes,
businesses, or other assets. To the extent that low resource holdings limit the potential for social
and economic development, understanding how those with limited assets can build up their asset
base is likely to be an important policy issue.
Income and Assets in Public Policy
Outside of education, traditional social programs that assist low-income populations have
focused mainly on income and social services that fulfill basic consumption needs, which have
been essential to the well-being of families and children. An asset-based approach could
complement this traditional approach and could shift the focus to the long-term development of
individuals, families, and communities. This focus provides a broader picture of the dynamics of
poverty among the low-income population.
v

Asset-based policy has many potential meanings. These include policies to promote the
accumulation and preservation of financial wealth, tangible property, human capital, social
capital, political participation and influence, cultural capital, and natural resources. While all of
these meanings have value, this series of reports focuses on building financial wealth and
tangible nonfinancial assets for household social and economic development.
The United States and many other countries already have large asset-based policies. In
many cases, these operate through the tax and employer-based systems, so that public transfers
occur via tax benefits (e.g., home mortgage interest deduction; tax breaks for contributions to a
variety of retirement accounts; tax-preferred education accounts and College Savings Plans; and
benefits for other emerging policies, such as Medical Savings Accounts). These asset-based
policies have grown rapidly in recent years and today represent a significant proportion of
overall federal expenditures and tax subsidies.
Asset Policy for Low-Income Households
Low-income individuals and families frequently do not participate in existing asset-based
mechanisms. The reasons may be threefold. First, this population is less likely to own homes,
investments, or retirement accounts, where most asset-based policies are targeted. Second, with
little or no federal income tax liability, the low-income have little or no tax incentives, or other
incentives, for asset accumulation. Third, asset limits in means-tested transfer policies have the
potential to discourage saving by the low-income population. In many respects, this population
does not have access to the same structures and incentives for asset accumulation. The potential
of asset building to promote long-term development of low-income households motivates this
series of reports. Poor Finances: Assets and Low-Income Households attempts to serve as a
central resource that provides a comprehensive assessment and critique of the current and
emerging knowledge base regarding asset building for low-income individuals and families.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Savings and assets can cushion families against sudden income losses and can bolster long-term
economic gains. These savings, however, can make a low-income family ineligible for benefits
from means-tested programs when they encounter economic difficulties. Most means-tested
programs restrict eligibility to families with assets that fall below a set threshold, and thus, may
have the unintended consequence of discouraging low-income families from saving.
In recent years, federal and state governments have implemented programs and program
rules to encourage savings among low-income families. Specifically, they have relaxed asset
rules for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program and the Food Stamp
Program (FSP), and have supported individual development account (IDA) programs. This
report examines the relationship between means-tested program rules and asset holding. We
examine the effects of state specific TANF, Food Stamp, IDA, EITC program rules and
minimum wage requirements on low-education single mothers and low-education families’
liquid asset holdings, vehicle asset holdings, and net worth.
Our analysis spans a 13 year period from 1991 through 2003, thereby capturing a time of
significant change to the AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp programs, as well as the introduction of
IDA programs. It also captures asset holdings during weak and strong economic times.
Individual-level data for the analysis come from multiple panels of the Survey of Income and
Program Participation (SIPP), and state program rules data come from a variety of sources,
including the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database, the Center for Social Development’s
and Corporation for Enterprise Development’s information on IDA programs, and the United
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS).
The empirical model uses the variation across states and in the timing of different state
rules to examine the relationship between 13 specific program rules and asset holdings. These
program rules (defined in table 3) are
•

AFDC/TANF Program Rules: unrestricted asset limit, vehicle asset limit, restricted
account asset limit, and maximum monthly benefit for a family of three. 1

•

Food Stamp Program Rules: vehicle asset limit and expanded categorical eligibility.

•

IDA Program Rules: maximum match rate, maximum amount qualified for match, and
eligibility beyond welfare recipients.

•

EITC Rules and Minimum Wage Requirements: state EITC amount, percentage of the
state EITC that is refundable, the state minimum wage for federally covered categories,
and the state minimum wage for non-federally covered categories.

1

Restricted accounts limit withdrawals to only certain types of activities, such as education, homeownership, or
business start-up. Unrestricted accounts do not have these restrictions and include savings and checking accounts.
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We estimate fixed effect regression models to measure the relationship between the
program rules and asset holdings. We estimate the models on two populations, for six asset
holding outcomes, and using two different specifications of the program rules. The two
populations are low-education (high school degree or less) single mother families and a broader
population of all low-education families. The six asset holding outcomes are (1) presence of
liquid assets, (2) value of liquid assets, (3) vehicle ownership, (4) vehicle equity, (5) net worth
(excluding housing), and (6) net worth (including housing). The two program rule specifications
are (1) the primary results which capture the relationship between detailed measures of state
program rules and the asset holding outcomes, and (2) an alternate specification which captures
the relationship between the number of years since a broad program change was implemented
and the asset holding outcomes. Below we highlight the statistically significant relationships that
make up the key findings from the two specifications.
Key Findings
Key findings from the primary results, which measure precise program rules, include the
following:
•

More generous unrestricted asset limits are not associated with increased liquid asset
holdings for either low-education single mothers or families;

•

More generous restricted account asset limits are associated with increased liquid asset
holdings for low-education single mothers and families;

•

More generous Food Stamp vehicle asset limits are associated with increased vehicle
asset holdings for low-education single mothers;

•

Expanded categorical eligibility in the Food Stamp Program is associated with increased
vehicle asset holdings for low-education single mothers and families;

•

More generous IDA program rules are associated with increased liquid asset holdings and
net worth;

•

A more generous state EITC amount is negatively associated with liquid asset holdings
but the percentage of the state EITC that is refundable is positively associated with liquid
asset holdings;

•

A more generous state minimum wage for federally covered categories (i.e., covered by
the Fair Labor Standards Act) is associated with increased liquid asset holdings, vehicle
asset holdings, and net worth.

Key findings from the alternate specification results, which measure the number of years since
broad program rules were implemented, include:

ES-2

•

The number of years since unrestricted asset limits became more generous (greater than
$1,000) is associated with increased liquid asset holdings for low-education single
mothers and families;

•

The number of years since restricted asset account limits became available is positively
but not statistically significantly associated with increased liquid asset holdings for either
low-education single mothers or families;

•

Mixed results but some evidence that number of years since both more generous Food
Stamp Program vehicle asset limits and expanded categorical eligibility are associated
with increased vehicle asset holdings;

•

The number of years since a state-sponsored IDA program became available is associated
with increased liquid asset holdings for low-education families.

Conclusions
The results of this study suggest that various state program rules adopted since the mid-1990s,
especially those aimed at asset building, are positively related to low-education single mothers’
and families’ asset holdings. The analysis suggests that more lenient asset limits in means-tested
programs and more generous IDA program rules may have positive effects on asset holdings.
These results suggest that maintaining and expanding these programs may help promote asset
ownership among economically vulnerable populations.
Findings from the primary model suggest that not every asset-building program rule has
the same effect. For example, more generous IDA rules are positively related to liquid asset
holdings and net worth and more lenient limits on restricted accounts are positively related to
liquid assets, while relaxed asset limits on unrestricted accounts have no significant relationship
with any type of asset holdings. The different incentive structures and program operations may
produce distinct outcomes: restrictions on withdrawals and incentives which are built into IDA
and restricted asset account limits may motivate low-education single mothers and families to
save and help them resist the temptation to spend. Accordingly, asset-building program rules
could be designed carefully to achieve policy goals.
Findings from the alternate specification, which measures the years since the more
generous rules were implemented, corroborate the IDA rule findings but not the unrestricted
versus restricted asset limit findings. This is the first study (known to the authors) to look at the
net relationships of restricted and unrestricted asset limits. The results are suggestive, but not
conclusive, that restricted account asset limits have different effects on asset building than
unrestricted asset limits. Additional research on this topic could shed further light on the role that
unrestricted asset limits, restricted account asset limits, and IDA programs play in asset building.
This study also shows that other non-TANF and IDA-related program rules are related to
the asset holdings of low-education single mothers and families. For example, Food Stamp
ES-3

Program vehicle asset limits and expanded categorical eligibility are positively related to vehicle
assets and net worth. These findings suggest that potential program interactions and indirect
effects of program rules on non-target populations are potentially important and could be
considered further in future research.

ES-4

I. INTRODUCTION

Savings and assets can cushion families against sudden income losses and can bolster long-term
economic gains. These savings, however, can make a low-income family ineligible for benefits
from means-tested programs when they encounter economic difficulties. Most means-tested
programs restrict eligibility to families with assets that fall below a set threshold, thereby
providing benefits only to those most in need. If asset restrictions have the unintended
consequence of discouraging low-income families from saving, asset tests may run counter to the
often cited government goal of promoting self-sufficiency.
In recent years, federal and state governments have implemented programs and program
rules to encourage savings, and thus promote self-sufficiency, among low-income families.
Specifically, they have relaxed asset rules for the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
(TANF) program and the Food Stamp Program (FSP), and have supported Individual
Development Account (IDA) programs. Despite the potential importance of these policy
changes, few studies have examined rules that limit saving and asset accumulation for
government benefit recipients, and what research does exist shows mixed results. This report
examines the effects of means-tested program rules on asset building and provides findings on
the following research questions:
1. What are the effects of specific TANF, Food Stamp, IDA, EITC program rules and
minimum wage requirements on liquid asset holdings?
2. What are the effects of specific TANF, Food Stamp, IDA, EITC program rules and
minimum wage requirements on vehicle asset holdings?
3. What are the effects of specific TANF, Food Stamp, IDA, EITC program rules and
minimum wage requirements on net worth?
To address these research questions, we examine several measures of asset holdings,
including liquid asset holdings, 2 vehicle ownership and equity, and net worth (with and without
housing equity). Our data come from the 1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, and 2001 Survey of Income
and Program Participation (SIPP) panels, which provide asset data from 1991 through 2003—a
period of significant change for the TANF and Food Stamp Programs, as well as the introduction
of IDA programs. This time period also allows us to capture asset holdings during weak and
strong economic times. The state program rules data come from a variety of sources, including
the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database, the Center for Social Development’s and
Corporation for Enterprise Development’s information on IDA programs, and the United States
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Nutrition Service (FNS).

2

Liquid assets include checking accounts, interest-earning accounts such as savings accounts, savings bonds, IRA
and Keogh accounts, and stocks.

1

We estimate the effect of 13 specific program rules and requirements on the asset
holdings of low-education (high school degree or less) families and low-education single
mothers. While our population of interest is low-income families, we use education to specify the
target population, rather than income, as a way to hold the study population more constant over
this time period. This is especially important given that this analysis spans a 13 year period from
the early 1990s to the 2000s. With changes in the economy over time, defining the population
based on income can result in significant changes to the study population over time, while
defining the population based on educational attainment results in a more constant study
population. In essence, we use low education to capture a more permanent measure of income
status.
This paper contributes to the literature in two important ways. First, we examine a
comprehensive set of 13 program rules hypothesized to affect asset holdings (e.g., welfare
program rules, FSP rules, IDA program rules, and EITC rules), while most studies examine a
more limited set of program rules. Second, our analysis is the first to examine both restricted and
unrestricted asset account limits for TANF eligibility.
Below we begin by providing background on state program rules and a brief discussion
of the relevant literature. This is followed by a description of the study population and data used
for the analysis, including the individual-level SIPP data, the state-level program rule data, and
the economic data. Next we present the methodology, followed by the results. The last section
discusses the study’s conclusions.
II. BACKGROUND

Both federal and state governments started to introduce asset-building policies for low-income
households during the 1990s. Examples include the relaxation of asset limits in means-tested
programs and the introduction of IDA programs. The Family Support Act of 1988 permitted
states to apply to the federal government for waivers to raise the Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) program’s asset limits. Without a federal waiver, states could not raise these
limits above the federal limits of $1,000 on liquid assets and $1,500 on vehicle assets (Powers
1998). The 1996 welfare reform legislation, which replaced AFDC with TANF, abolished the
federal asset limits for welfare, allowing states to create their own limits (Savner and Greenberg
1995; Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002).
Taking advantage of the federal policy changes, many states increased AFDC/TANF
limits imposed on liquid assets in unrestricted accounts and vehicle assets. In addition, some
states created restricted account programs. Restricted accounts have separate and higher asset
limits than unrestricted accounts, but withdrawals are limited to only certain types of activities,
such as education, homeownership, or business start-up (Savner and Greenberg 1995;
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Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002). By 2003, for example, 25 states exempted at
least one vehicle and 28 states had introduced restricted accounts.
In comparison to AFDC/TANF, asset limits in the Food Stamp Program were liberalized
more slowly. Liquid asset limits remained unchanged during the 1980s and 1990s (at $3,000 and
$2,000 for households with and without an elderly member, respectively). Also, the federal
vehicle asset limit increased by only $150 (in nominal dollars) during this period, although the
federal government did allow a few states to ease vehicle asset limits (via waivers). 3 The federal
government took significant steps to liberalize FSP liquid asset and vehicle asset limits in 2001
and 2002 (Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002; Pavetti et al. 2002; Super and Dean
2001).
During the 1990s, federal and state governments also began to adopt IDA programs,
which are asset-building programs targeted at low-income households. IDAs are matched saving
accounts, created to encourage low-income, low-wealth households to accumulate assets for their
long-term economic development. IDA programs create accounts for participants to save for
specific purposes, such as higher education, home ownership, and business start-up. In addition,
IDA programs provide matching funds at the time of withdrawal (i.e., matched withdrawals), if
savings will be used for one of pre-set goals (Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002;
Sherraden 1991; Sherraden 2001).
Recognizing the potential effectiveness of IDA programs (based on privately funded IDA
programs such as the American Dream Demonstration project), some states instituted IDA
programs through legislation, executive orders, or administrative decisionmaking during the mid1990s (Warren and Edwards 2005). State IDA initiatives were facilitated by subsequent federal
legislation. The welfare-to-work law of 1997 permitted grantees to use TANF funds for IDA
programs. Further, the Assets for Independence Act (AFIA) of 1998 created the first federallyfunded national demonstration programs for IDAs. AFIA mandates the Office of Community
Services in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) to award five-year grants to
nonprofit organizations and to government or financial institutions partnering with nonprofits for
IDA programs (Corporation for Enterprise Development 2002).
Although IDA programs have been growing rapidly since the mid 1990s, an important
question is whether there are sufficient numbers of IDA programs to capture the effect of these
program rules on asset holdings using nationally representative survey data, such as the Survey
of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) used for this report. Our investigation finds that it is
not possible to obtain a reliable estimate of IDA participation or the number of IDA programs in

3

In January 1999, for example, three states had federal waivers that allowed them to exempt one vehicle when
determining FSP eligibility.
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the United States, 4 so this issue remains a potential limitation of this study. The robustness of the
IDA program findings in this report suggests that IDA programs may be important.
III. LITERATURE

Effect of Means-Tested Program Rules on Asset Holdings
There is limited empirical research on the effect of means-tested program rules on asset building.
Hurst and Ziliak (2006), Nam (forthcoming), Powers (1998), and Sullivan (2006) examine the
effect of AFDC/TANF asset limits on asset holdings. In addition, a study by Gruber and
Yelowitz (1999) examines Medicaid asset-related rules and net worth. All of these studies use
quasi-experimental methods to identify the effects of program rules on asset building. In
addition, a relatively new literature uses both experimental and non-experimental methods to
examine the impact of IDA programs on asset building. These studies include Schreiner et al.
(2005), U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Interim Report to Congress on the
Assets for Independence Program (2004), Stegman and Faris (2005), and Mills et al. (2006). We
discuss these literatures below and present summaries of the studies in appendix tables A-1 and
A-2.
Researchers have examined the effect of AFDC/TANF program rules on liquid assets,
bank account ownership, home ownership, and vehicle ownership and equity. 5 The findings from
this literature are mixed. Of four empirical studies, two studies find that relaxing AFDC/TANF
program rules did not increase households’ liquid asset holdings or net worth (Hurst and Ziliak
2006; Sullivan 2006), while two others find that they did increase households’ liquid asset
holdings (Nam forthcoming) or net worth (Powers 1998). Sullivan (2006) uses data from the
1992, 1993, and 1996 SIPP panels to examine how the dollar value of AFDC/TANF limits of
vehicle assets and countable assets (the sum of liquid assets and vehicle values that exceed the
vehicle asset limit) affect single mothers’ liquid assets and net worth (excluding housing). He
finds no evidence that relaxing these program rules increases liquid asset holdings or net worth.
Consistent with this finding, Hurst and Ziliak (2006), using the 1994 and 2001 waves of the
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), find that changes in AFDC/TANF countable asset
limits and vehicle asset limits do not affect the liquid assets or net worth (including housing) of
female-headed households with children.
Powers (1998) and Nam (forthcoming) on the other hand, find that AFDC/TANF
program changes increase single mothers’ asset holdings. Using 1978 and 1983 data from the
National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women, Powers (1998) finds that an increase of $1 in
4

This was confirmed by an IDA expert, Karen Edwards at the Center for Social Development. IDA Program
participation is not captured in nationally representative data sources such as the Survey of Income and Program
participation (SIPP) and no known data source captures all IDA programs in the country.
5
Liquid assets in these studies are defined as the sum of dollar values in checking and saving accounts, saving
bonds, stocks and other financial investments.
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countable asset limits for AFDC families raised a female head’s net worth (excluding vehicle
equity) by 25 cents. Although Powers’ analysis is based on data from nearly three decades ago,
this study is able to exploit the change in federal AFDC asset test policy that occurred in 1981 to
identify the effect of a change in asset limits. Using more recent data from the 1994 and 2001
waves of the PSID, Nam (forthcoming) finds that increasing state’s AFDC/TANF countable
assets limits leads to higher bank account ownership and higher liquid asset holdings among
female-headed households with children.
Nam (forthcoming) and Hurst and Ziliak (2006) use the same data, but come to different
conclusions by using different program rule measures. Nam (forthcoming) expands on Hurst and
Ziliak’s analysis by estimating models that measure the length of time since states adopted new
asset limits. These “length of time” measures capture the fact that states introduced new asset
tests at different times and that it may take time for a target population to learn about and adapt
to program rule changes. Nam (forthcoming) finds that the earlier a state raised its countable
asset limit, the more likely are female-headed households with children to have positive savings
and/or a bank account. Nam (forthcoming) and Hurst and Ziliak (2006) also examine different
measures of savings, which may explain why the results of these studies differ with regard to the
effect of higher asset limits on savings. Nam examines a nonlinear measure of saving (natural
logarithm) and find that the amount of saving is significantly higher for those living in states
with higher asset limits, while Hurst and Ziliak examine a linear measure and find no effect of
asset limits on savings.
The research on the effect of AFDC/TANF program rules on vehicle ownership is also
mixed. The same studies by Sullivan (2006) and Hurst and Ziliak (2006) find evidence that
relaxing asset limits leads to higher vehicle ownership, while Nam (forthcoming) finds no
evidence that vehicle ownership increases when asset limits are relaxed. 6 The different results
between Nam (forthcoming) and the other two studies may be explained by different sample
selection and model specifications. In addition to these analyses of AFDC/TANF program rules,
a study by Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) examines the effect of Medicaid program rules on
household wealth. Using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and the SIPP (1984 and
1993 panels), they find that Medicaid eligibility and Medicaid asset tests lower households’ net
worth.
Why Empirical Analyses May Not Find an Effect of Asset Tests on Asset Holdings
Researchers have descriptively examined the assets of potential welfare recipients as a way to
understand why asset tests may not affect liquid asset holdings. Hurst and Ziliak (2006) examine
Sullivan (2006) examines the possible interaction between AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp asset rules with an
alternative asset policy measure by setting a state’s countable and vehicle asset limits as the lower limit of each type
across these two programs. The results of this analysis are consistent with his main finding—relaxing vehicle asset
limits increases vehicle ownership, while relaxing countable asset limits does not show any significant impact.

6
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the liquid asset holdings among likely welfare recipients, defined as single mothers with less
than 16 years of schooling. They conclude that the majority of likely welfare recipients are not
influenced by increases in asset limits because most have asset holdings that are below the
original limits. For example, the median liquid asset holdings of likely welfare recipients were
zero in 1989, 1994, and 2001. Similarly, Sullivan’s (2006) study shows relatively low liquid
assets among potential welfare recipients. However, Sullivan suggests that the vehicle asset limit
in place under AFDC might have been more binding than liquid asset limits because vehicle
ownership is more common among potential welfare recipients. Among single mothers with a
high school degree or less, 58 percent owned a vehicle and the mean vehicle equity value was
$1,862 (p. 84), almost 25 percent higher than the amount of the former AFDC vehicle asset limit
of $1,500. After removing those who graduated from high school from the data, Sullivan found
vehicle ownership and equity to be somewhat lower among single mothers without a high school
degree—43 percent owned a vehicle with a mean vehicle equity value of $1,153 (p. 84).
Blank and Ruggles (1996) use SIPP data to show that the percentage of months for which
single mothers were ineligible for AFDC benefits increased only slightly when assets were taken
into account (from 57.0 percent when only income was considered to 60.2 percent when both
income and assets were considered). 7 While some likely welfare recipients own liquid assets
high enough to be disqualified by old AFDC asset tests, the relatively low liquid asset holdings
of potential welfare recipients (below the old AFDC asset limits) might help to explain why
some studies in the literature find that increasing asset limits does not lead to higher asset
holdings.
While the data show that potential welfare recipients hold low levels of assets, it is still
possible that these asset limits are impacting low-income families’ asset holdings. Current and
potential welfare recipients may save at suboptimal levels because they misunderstand program
rules. In fact, qualitative interviews with TANF recipients in Virginia and Maryland suggest that
welfare recipients were misinformed about program rules and that this misinformation led to
lower asset holdings (O'Brien 2006). Most of the recipients in the O’Brien study believed that
TANF asset limits were much lower than the actual limits. In addition, several of the
interviewees reported spending down their bank accounts before applying for cash assistance.
Thus, TANF asset limits may be affecting families’ asset holdings, even though their asset
holdings are well below asset limits.
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Results from Blank and Ruggles (1996) suggest that AFDC asset limits had only a small effect on AFDC benefit
receipt, because asset limits affect the AFDC eligibility of only a small fraction of single mothers. To date, the
literature has only descriptively examined how AFDC/TANF asset limits affect TANF participation. To improve our
understanding of how asset limits affect welfare participation, future work could examine this relationship in a
multivariate framework.
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Effect of IDA Program Rules on Asset Holdings
What do we know about the effect of IDA program rules on asset holdings? Current research
provides some evidence that IDA programs increase low-income households’ asset holdings.
Although the majority of these studies show positive effects of IDA programs on asset
accumulation (Schreiner et al. 2005; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004;
Stegman and Faris 2005; Mills et al. 2006), some questions remain unanswered due to
limitations in study designs and sample representation. In addition, we still know little about IDA
programs’ long-term effects on net worth and liquid assets.
Several studies based on IDA monitoring data conclude that low-income households can
save in individual development accounts, because a majority of participants made deposits into
their IDAs and a substantial proportion succeeded in making matched withdrawals (Schreiner et
al. 2005; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004; Losby and Robinson 2004). 8
Stegman and Faris (2005) estimate that the median participant in an IDA program saved $117
more than he/she would have saved without American Dream Demonstration (ADD)
participation, based on their simulated results using ADD Account Monitoring data and a
comparable low-income low-asset sample drawn from the Survey of Consumer Finance. 9
Controlling for selection into an IDA program with a controlled field experiment, Mills et
al. (2006) find that the IDA program raised homeownership rates by almost 10 percentage points
over four years for black renters, but reduced their financial assets and business ownership,
possibly indicating the need to liquidate assets to afford down payments and housing transition
costs. The IDA program had no effects on homeownership for white renters, but their business
equity rose. Overall, the IDA program had no statistically significant effect on net worth, which
may be explained by the short four-year time frame of the study and the initial costs associated
with home purchase and other asset investments.
Two qualitative studies produce results consistent with those found in the quantitative
research described above. In-depth interviews with program participants show that low-income
8

According to American Dream Demonstration Account Monitoring data (ADD-AM), the majority of program
participants (53 percent) saved at least $100 in their ADD accounts; the average net deposits were $537 and average
monthly deposits were $21; and about 35 percent made matched withdrawals. The average value of matched
withdrawals (including matches) was $2,711 (Schreiner et al. 2005). Another large-scale demonstration, authorized
by the Assets For Independence Act (AFIA) and some smaller-scale studies produced similar results based on their
own IDA account monitoring data (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 2004; Losby and Robinson
2004; Schreiner et al. 2002). Account monitoring studies, however, have drawbacks in their methodology. First,
these studies do not have information on non-IDA assets, and therefore, do not measure whether deposits into IDAs
are true savings or substitutions of savings that would have gone into other savings vehicles. Second, assets
accumulated in IDAs may not be attributed purely to IDA effects because participants may have saved in the
absence of the IDA.
9
In assessing the effect of ADD on low-income households’ asset accumulation, Stegman and Faris (2005) assume
that ADD participants save solely into IDAs during the program participation period. They justify their assumption
based on the strong incentive built in to the programs (100 to 700 percent return) and that it likely convinced
participants that ADD was the most desirable saving tool available to them.
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IDA participants were able to save despite continuous financial challenges (e.g., layoffs). The
majority of participants succeeded in saving in IDAs and a substantial proportion of them did so
regularly. These studies also show the role of program components other than matches: many
interviewees valued financial education classes and social supports from IDA staff members and
fellow participants (Hogan et al. 2004; Shobe and Christy-McMullin 2005).
Despite promising results in early IDA evaluation studies, it remains unclear whether
IDA programs have positive long-term impacts on non-IDA assets, especially net worth and
liquid assets in non-IDA accounts. It also remains unanswered whether IDA effects observed can
be generalized to the low-income population because IDA applicants may differ from lowincome households in terms of their level of motivation to save and other unobservable
characteristics.
IV. STUDY POPULATION

Our population of interest for the Poor Finances series of reports has been low-income
populations. In this study, we define two key study populations—low-education single (i.e.,
unmarried) mothers who may or may not be cohabiting 10 and a broader population of loweducation families, that includes both single and married parent families. 11 We examine loweducation populations rather than low-income populations, because low-education is a more
permanent and exogenous measure of income status. Using education rather than income to
specify the target population results in a more constant study population over time, which is
important as our analysis spans 13 years. With changes in the economy over time, defining the
population based on income can result in significant changes to the study population from year to
year, while defining the population based on educational attainment results in a more constant
study population over time.
For this study, low-education is defined as having no education beyond high school. Our
population of single mothers has a high school degree or less, and, for married-couple families,
both persons in the couple have to have a high school degree or less to be defined as low
education. To focus our analysis on the working-age population, we restrict the study population
to single mothers ages 18 through 54. Low-education families are included if one or both of the
adults (head and spouse) are ages 18 through 54. The study populations are selected based on
characteristics at the time of the survey. Our focus on the less educated is designed to limit our
analysis to disadvantaged populations likely to participate in means-tested programs. Loweducation single mothers are of special interest because they are a group likely to be potential
10

While our sample of single mothers includes mothers with a cohabiting partner, only the assets of the single
mother are considered in the analysis. We think that it is unlikely that assets (unlike income) are shared between
cohabiting partners. Also, most welfare programs consider the parent(s) and child as the filing unit, so the assets of
the cohabiting partner may not be considered in eligibility and benefit determination.
11
Families are defined using the U.S. Census Bureau’s definition of a family, which is two or more people who are
living together and are related by blood, marriage, or adoption.
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welfare participants, while low-education families are of interest because they represent the
group of potential participants for the Food Stamp Program and IDA programs.
V. DATA

Survey of Income and Program Participation
The individual-level data come from the 1990, 1992, 1993, 1996, and 2001 SIPP panels. Each
SIPP panel contains a nationally representative (noninstitutional) sample of between 20,000 and
37,000 households and when combined provides data from 1991 through 2003. This 13 year
period captures a time of significant change to the AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp programs, as
well as the introduction of IDA programs. It also captures asset holdings during weak and strong
economic times, including part of the July 1990 to March 1991 recession, the March 2001 to
November 2001 recession (National Bureau of Economic Research 2005), and the economic
boom of the late 1990s.
SIPP respondents are interviewed every four months about the previous four months, a
period referred to as a “wave.” SIPP monthly data are collected as part of the “core”
questionnaire, which is administered in each wave. The SIPP also includes “topical modules,”
which collect supplemental information on a variety of topics and are administered periodically.
The core questionnaire collects information about family structure, income from assets, program
participation, and educational attainment. Asset and liability data come from the asset and
liability topical module, which has been administered once a year in recent panels. The asset and
liability topical module asks respondents about asset holdings and liabilities at the time of
interview. 12
One limitation in using the SIPP (or other nationally representative surveys) to capture
asset holdings is that it captures only assets held in formal transaction accounts, such as checking
or savings accounts. It does not capture cash held under a mattress, for example. Thus, our
analysis is capturing the effect of programs on assets held in the formal financial sector.
The key dependent variables—liquid assets, vehicle ownership and equity, and net worth
(including and excluding housing)—are calculated from the asset and liability topical modules.
They are calculated on an annual basis, and are based on all waves where asset data are available
in the five panels used in this analysis. This includes waves 4 and 7 of the 1990, 1992, and 1993
panels; waves 3, 6, 9, and 12 of the 1996 panel; and waves 3, 6, and 9 of the 2001 panel.
12

For a detailed discussion of the SIPP asset data including data quality issues, see another report in the Poor
Finances series by Ratcliffe et al. (forthcoming). Ratcliffe et al. assess the quality of 19 data sets for providing
information on low-income households’ assets and liabilities, and identify the SIPP, along with the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (PSID) and Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), as being the strongest data sets. Sample
attrition and response rates are among the data quality issues discussed. For example, response rates are between 68
and 87 percent in the SIPP (varies across panels), 50 percent over the full panel of the PSID (94 to 98 percent
between waves), and 68 percent in the SCF.
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Unfortunately, the net worth analysis does not include data from wave 7 of the 1990 and 1992
panels or wave 4 of the 1993 panel because the full asset and liability topical module is not
available in these waves and the full module is needed to calculate net worth (but not liquid
assets or vehicle ownership).
Our measure of liquid assets includes checking accounts, interest-earning accounts such
as savings accounts, savings bonds, IRA and Keogh accounts, and stocks. Families are classified
as owning a vehicle if the value of the family's cars is greater than zero and vehicle equity is
measured as the difference between the family car value and car debt. 13 Our measure of net
worth that includes housing is the sum of home equity, vehicle equity, business equity, value of
checking and savings accounts, value of interest earning assets, stock and mutual fund equity,
other real estate equity, other assets, IRA/Keogh accounts, and retirement/thrift accounts less
unsecured debt. Our alternate net worth measure simply excludes home equity because of
potential measurement error issues in trying to value homes.
To control for changes in the economy, the SIPP data are supplemented with annual
state-level economic data on (1) unemployment rates, (2) per capita income, and (3)
employment-population ratios.
Table 1 presents demographic and economic characteristics of low-education single
mothers and low-education families, as well as state economic conditions of the two samples.
The average age of the single mother sample is 32.7, while the average age of the head of
household of the low-education family sample is 37.3. There are other differences between the
two populations. Compared with all low-education families, low-education single mothers are
more likely to be black or Hispanic (53.5 percent versus 34.7 percent), are more likely to have no
high school degree (36.0 percent versus 26.1 percent), and have more children (an average of 1.9
versus 1.1). The state economic indicators are virtually identical across the two populations. 14
Table 2 shows that low-education single mothers consistently have fewer assets than the
population of all low-education families. Among single mothers, 33.3 percent have liquid assets
and 48.3 percent own a vehicle, while the corresponding statistics for low-education families are
58.9 and 75.2 percent, respectively. The value of liquid asset holdings, vehicle equity, and net
worth are also lower among low-education single mothers than low-education families. As
mentioned above, our focus on single mothers allows us examine a population that is most likely
affected by TANF asset limits (as well as FSP asset limits and IDA programs), while our
analysis of all low-education families provides an understanding of how these programs affect a

13

The SIPP collects information on vehicle makes, models, and years, and then uses Blue Book prices to calculate
the vehicle values.
14
State economic conditions can vary across the two populations if the populations are not equally distributed across
states.
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Table 1. Sample Characteristics of Low-Education Single Mothers and Families,
Age 18–54, 1991–2003 SIPP
Mothers

Families

28.3%

7.8%

42.2%

15.8%

32.7

37.3

Black (0/1)

33.9%

17.0%

Hispanic (0/1)

19.6%

17.7%

Education less than high school (0/1)

36.0%

26.1%

Number of children in family (#)

1.9

1.1

Number of adults in family (#)

1.2

1.7

Metro area (0/1)

78.0%

74.0%

State unemployment rate (%)

5.8%

5.8%

State per-capita income ($/person)

$26,423

$26,311

State employment population ratio

0.47

0.47

Sample Size

15,635

77,664

Benefit Receipt
Percentage receiving AFDC/TANF
Percentage receiving Food Stamps
Demographic and Economic Controls
Age (years)

Note: Age, race/ethnicity, and education variables are for mothers in the single mothers
sample and for the highest education person (of the head or spouse, taking the male if both
are equally educated) in the families sample. The state employment to population ratio is the
total state employment divided by the state's population. All dollar values expressed in year
2000 dollars as calculated using the implicit price deflator for personal consumption
expenditures.
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Table 2. Asset Holdings of Low-Education Single Mothers and Families,
Age 18–54, 1991–2003 SIPP

Mothers

Families

33.3%
15,635

58.9%
77,664

$258
($7)
$0
$0
$51
15,158

$2,630
($26)
$0
$98
$1,469
75,341

48.3%
15,635

75.2%
77,664

$1,140
($17)
$0
$0
$1,603
15,144

$3,301
($16)
$0
$1,603
$5,260
75,305

Net Worth (Including Home Equity)
Mean
(Standard deviation)
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
Sample size

$5,113
($320)
$0
$0
$3,350
12,048

$27,177
($1,195)
$0
$4,368
$33,796
58,418

Net Worth (Excluding Home Equity)
Mean
(Standard deviation)
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
Sample size

$1,117
($62)
$0
$0
$1,738
12,059

$8,526
($409)
$0
$1,502
$8,141
58,433

Liquid Asset Holdings
Percentage holding liquid assets (liquid asset >0)
Sample size
Liquid asset amount:
Mean
(Standard deviation)
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
Sample size
Vehicle Asset Holdings
Percentage owning at least one vehicle
Sample size
Vehicle equity amount:
Mean
(Standard deviation)
25th percentile
50th percentile
75th percentile
Sample size

Note: Sample size varies because statistics for asset holding amounts exclude observations in
the top 3 percentiles of liquid assets and vehicle equity, and the top and bottom 3 percentiles of
net worth. All dollar values expressed in year 2000 dollars as calculated using the implicit
price deflator for personal consumption expenditures.
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broader population of families (those who are less disadvantaged yet are potential participants
for the Food Stamp Program and IDA programs).
Welfare and Food Stamps
The 13 specific state program rules hypothesized to affect asset holdings are the explanatory
variables for the analysis. They include four welfare rules, two Food Stamp Program rules, three
IDA rules, and four minimum wage and EITC measures. These variables are measured from
1991 through 2003. Table 3 provides definitions for the variables and table 4 presents their
descriptive statistics. We describe the data sources below and the appendix provides more
detailed specifics for each rule.
The four welfare rules capture three asset limit rules and the maximum monthly welfare
benefit. They are measured using the Urban Institute’s Welfare Rules Database (WRD) and
related databases. 15 The WRD was built using AFDC state plans and waiver terms and
conditions prior to 1997 and caseworker manuals and state regulations from 1997 to the present;
much of these data were verified by state staff. The WRD and related databases are
supplemented with information from the Urban Institute’s Transfer Income Model (TRIM3) 16
and the First Annual TANF Report to Congress, as necessary.
The two Food Stamp Program (FSP) rules measure vehicle asset exemption (at least one
vehicle exempt from asset rules) and expanded categorical eligibility. Expanded categorical
eligibility extends categorical eligibility for food stamps to units that receive TANF services (not
just TANF cash benefits). These rules come from Food and Nutrition Service (FNS) State
Options Reports, FNS waivers and other documentation, the Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, and the Federal Register. Many of these data sources were identified in consultation
with the U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Economic Research Services (ERS) and FNS, and
have been provided to us by these agencies.
IDAs
The three IDA program rules—maximum match rate, maximum match allowed for saving, and
eligibility beyond welfare recipients—are measured using the Center for Social Development’s
(CSD) 2005 Survey on State IDA programs, CSD’s State IDA Policy Information, and other
sources listed in the Appendix. The survey data are collected directly from state officials and
personnel working on the state IDA programs.
15

The official Welfare Rules Database (WRD) measures data from 1996 forward. We use the more general term
“related databases” when measuring state program rules from the non-official WRD, which captures some program
rules prior to 1996.
16
TRIM3 is a microsimulation model developed at the Urban Institute (under primary funding from Department of
Health and Human Services) that simulates major governmental tax, transfer, and health programs that affect the
U.S. population. This model undergoes constant development and is updated annually to capture the latest changes
in tax and transfer programs. It is information on state programs that we have incorporated into this study.
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Table 3. Program Rule Variable Definitions

Program Rule Variable
AFDC/TANF

Description
The dollar value of any asset the state counts toward the limit
(e.g., savings and checking accounts, bonds, stocks, and
vehicle values that exceed the vehicle asset limit) that a
family may hold and still be eligibile for welfare benefits.

(1) Unrestricted asset limit
(2) Vehicle asset limit for recipients, at least one vehicle

At least one vehicle per unit exempt from asset limit

(3) Restricted account asset limit

The dollar value excluded from asset limits of savings account
assets earmarked for specfic purposes (e.g., IDAs, post
secondary education)

(4) Maximum monthly benefit for family of 3

Maximum monthly benefit for a family of 3 with no
income

Food Stamp Program (FSP)
(1) FSP vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle

At least one vehicle per unit exempt from asset limit

(2) Expanded categorical eligibility

State uses expanded categorical eligibility - receipt of TANF
services (with or without cash assistance) makes unit
automatically eligible for food stamps

IDA
(1) Maximum match rate

The number of dollars a state will contribute to a family's IDA
account for every dollar the family contributes

(2) Maximum amount qualified for match

The maximum amount a state will match in a family's IDA
account

(3) Eligibility beyond welfare recipients

State does not require participants in the state IDA program to
already be enrolled in the state's welfare program

Minimum Wage and EITC
(1) State EITC

The maximum EITC offered by the state

(2) Percentage of state EITC refundable

The percentage of the state EITC that is refundable, obtained
by dividing the refundable amount by the maximum EITC
amount offered by the state

(3) State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories
(4) State minimum wage for non-FLSA covered categories

Higher of the state or federal minimum wage
State minimum wage for non-federally covered categories
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Table 4. State AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp, and Related Program Rules:
Number of States with Rule and Mean Value of Rule by Year

Program Rule Variable
AFDC/TANF
(1) Unrestricted asset limit (Mean Asset limit) ($)
(2) Vehicle asset limit (Mean asset limit) ($)
(3) Vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle (# of states)
(4) Restricted account asset limit (Mean asset limit) ($)
(5) Restricted account asset limit (# of states)
(6) Maximum monthly benefit for family of 3
Food Stamp Program (FSP)
(1) FSP vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle (# of states)
(2) Expanded categorical eligibility (# of states)
IDA
(1) State IDA programs (# of states)
(2) Maximum match rate (Mean) ($)
(3) Maximum amount qualified for match (Mean) ($)
(4) Eligibility beyond welfare recipients (# of states)
EITC and Minimum Wage
(1) State EITC ($)
(2) Percentage of state EITC refundable
(3) State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories ($)
(4) State minimum wage for non-FLSA covered categories ($)

1991

1993

1995

1997

1999

2001

2003

$1,199
$1,798
0
$0
0
$459.60

$1,139
$5,150
0
$25
1
$440.48

$1,353
$5,745
2
$380
4
$423.24

$2,366
$9,967
19
$2,336
14
$403.52

$2,730
$10,748
22
$3,416
20
$402.42

$2,652
$10,562
24
$4,191
23
$393.84

$2,587
$10,333
25
$5,247
28
$385.81

0
0

0
0

1
0

3
0

3
0

2
38

30
36

0
$0.00
$0
0

0
$0.00
$0
0

0
$0.00
$0
0

4
$0.16
$443
3

9
$0.36
$700
7

24
$1.10
$6,292
20

24
$1.10
$6,263
19

$38.30
4.3%
$5.14
$3.04

$46.39
4.3%
$4.95
$3.02

$92.28
6.5%
$4.76
$2.90

$123.66
8.7%
$5.10
$3.03

$155.18
13.5%
$5.40
$3.25

$205.66
18.1%
$5.27
$3.18

$222.17
20.4%
$5.18
$3.13

Note: Means include 0's. All dollar values expressed in year 2000 dollars as calculated using the implicit price deflator for personal consumption expenditures.

15

The following four criteria are used to define IDA programs: (1) matches savings when
withdrawn for pre-defined purposes; 17 (2) is funded at least partially from state government,
including those from TANF and welfare-to-work programs (excludes programs funded solely by
private foundations); (3) is established through state legislation or administrative rule-making;
and (4) is actually implemented. The second and third criteria are used because we cannot
identify the universe of IDA programs without these restrictions. There are numerous community
programs (mostly small and short-lived) under IDA title. In addition, the money in these nonstate
programs cannot be exempted from asset tests for most public assistance programs.
EITC and Minimum Wage
We measure the earned income tax credit (EITC) with two program rules, the maximum state
EITC (measured at the end of the phase-in range) and the percentage of the state EITC that is
refundable. These variables are measured using Neumark and Wascher (2001) among other
sources listed in the appendix.
The minimum wage is measured with two variables—the applicable minimum wage for
federally covered categories of workers and the state minimum wage for non-federally covered
categories. In 1999, 72 percent of all workers were federally covered, that is, covered by the Fair
Labor Standards Act (FLSA). Workers in non-federally covered categories include most workers
in small businesses or in businesses where no interstate commerce is involved; workers in
seasonal or recreational jobs; workers delivering newspapers or engaged in fishing operations;
many workers in private households; and executive, administrative, and professional employees
(U.S. Department of Labor 2001). The minimum wage measures come from the U.S. Department
of Labor “History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates,” and Nelson’s Monthly Labor Review,
among other sources. The analysis controls for other federal asset-related policies such as the
Saver’s Credit and Federal EITC with year fixed effects.
State welfare, food stamp, and related program rules are summarized throughout our
observation period in table 4. From 1991 to 2003, states became more generous in terms of asset
limits, IDA program rules, and the EITC, though mean unrestricted asset limits peaked in 1999
and declined slightly each year after due to inflation. The number of states adopting IDA
programs also increased over this period. As of 2003, 24 states supported IDAs, of which 16
states allowed the participation of non-welfare families. States expanded their EITC programs
over time as shown in mean state EITC values and the percentage of states’ EITC that is
refundable.
From 1991 to 2003, states became more restrictive in their AFDC/TANF benefit levels.
The inflation-adjusted maximum AFDC/TANF benefit level declined throughout the observation
17

Some states call their saving-incentive programs for low-income families IDA programs even though the program
does not match savings.
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period. This decline was attributable both to benefits not keeping up with inflation and states
actually reducing the nominal benefit amount.
VI. METHODOLOGY

The methodology is designed to measure the effect of minimum wage requirements and
AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp, IDA, and EITC program rules on asset holdings. Families’ asset
holdings are measured with six separate variables: (1) presence of liquid assets, (2) value of
liquid assets, (3) vehicle ownership, (4) vehicle equity, (5) net worth (excluding housing), and
(6) net worth (including housing). States implemented different rule changes to their
AFDC/TANF, Food Stamp, IDA, EITC, and minimum wage programs at different times from
1991 through 2003, and the model uses this variation across states and time to identify the effect
of program rules on asset holdings. A benefit of this 13 year time period is that it captures
families’ asset holding during both weak and strong economic times, including the economic
boom of the late 1990s and the 1991 and 2001 recessions (National Bureau of Economic
Research 2005).
Identifying the effect of program rules on asset holdings requires disentangling the effect
of state and federal rules from other factors that affect asset holdings, such as economic
conditions (e.g., unemployment rate) and unobservable state characteristics (e.g., public
sentiment towards welfare recipients). If, for example, public sentiment towards welfare
recipients affects both a state’s welfare asset limits and the likelihood individuals in that state
consider welfare to be an option, and in turn their asset holdings (e.g., they begin to save for an
economic crisis because welfare is believed to be less available), then omitting public sentiment
would produce biased estimates. The model captures unobservable state and time differences
with state fixed effects (which control for differences across states) and year fixed effects (which
control for differences across years).18
The model details are presented below for one of the asset holding measures—presence
of liquid asset holdings. This is followed by a more general discussion of the models estimated
for the other five asset holding measures. We estimate a linear probability model for “family has
liquid asset holdings” (Y) for family i in state s in year t:
Y ist = α + β 1 ' WP st + β 2 ' FSP st + β 3 ' IDA

st

+ β 4 ' EITC

st

+ β 5 ' MW st + δ 1 ' X ist + δ 2 ' S st + μ s + τ t + ν ist .

WPst represents the vector of state-level specific AFDC/TANF program rules in state s in year t.
Similarly, FSPst, IDAst, EITCst, and MWst represent the vectors of state-level specific Food
Stamp, IDA, EITC, and minimum wage program rules in state s in year t, respectively.

18

If public sentiment towards welfare recipients does not change over time, then the state fixed effects would fully
capture this.
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The vector Xist represents family composition and demographic characteristics of family i
in state s in year t, including age, age-squared, race and ethnicity (black, Hispanic), 19 educational
attainment (less than high school), 20 number of children in family, number of adults in family,
and live in metropolitan area. Age of the family head reflects the ability and motivation of the
family head to save at his/her stage in the life cycle (Modigliani and Brumberg 1954) and is
expected to have a positive sign for our sample of working-aged families. Race and ethnicity
measure different saving environments and behaviors among different racial and ethnic groups
(Shapiro 2004), while education captures financial literacy as well as permanent income
(Hubbard, et al. 1995). The household composition variables capture consumption needs of a
family, as well as the number of potential earners (Bird and Hagstrom 1999). The indicator of
living in a metro area reflects families’ need for a vehicle and accessibility to banking facilities.
The vector Sst represents state-level nonprogram rule variables in year t (i.e.,
unemployment rate, per capita income, and employment-population ratio). We control for
economic conditions because they can affect families’ employment and income, as well as states’
policy choices (Plotnick and Winters 1985). Finally, μs is the state fixed-effect, τt is the year
fixed effect, and νist is the random error term. We estimate a linear probability model with
weights to correct for heteroscedasticity, based on the SIPP individual and family weights. To
account for potential serial correlation in the error term, we cluster our standard errors by state as
recommended by Bertrand et al. (2004).
The analysis of “vehicle ownership” also uses a linear probability model, as described
above. The models estimated for “value of liquid assets” and “vehicle equity” are designed to
take account of the fact that a relatively large fraction of families in our sample do not hold
liquid assets (41 to 67 percent) or own a vehicle (25 to 52 percent). Specifically, we estimate a
Tobit model. Finally, our analyses of net worth (including and excluding housing) are based on
weighted ordinary least squares models. All five models include the same set of explanatory
variables that are in the “have liquid assets” model, as well as the state and year fixed effects. 21
Our main models examine the contemporaneous relationship between family asset
holdings and state program rules. However, it is likely that there are longer-run changes that
result from behavioral responses to the program rule change. As a result, we carry out additional
specifications that examine the number of years the program rules have been in place.

19

The omitted category is non-black, non-Hispanic.
The omitted category is high school education.
21
In the Tobit models, the standard errors are not clustered by state.
20
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VII. RESULTS

This section presents results from our multivariate analysis of the effects of state program rules
on the asset holdings of low-education (high school degree or less) single mother families and a
broader population of all low-education families.
State means-tested social program rules could affect asset holdings through four
hypothesized effects: (1) asset test effect—asset tests associated with means-tested social
programs could discourage asset holding in order to qualify for benefits; (2) precautionary
savings effect—the need to save in case of emergency could be reduced if families know that
program benefits will provide a minimum level of consumption in an emergency (Hubbard et al.
1995); (3) income effect—by providing additional income (such as benefits and program
matches) from which to save, social programs could increase asset holdings; and (4) substitution
effect—program rules that affect only specific types of asset holdings could encourage families
to substitute one type of asset for another type (e.g., generous vehicle asset exemptions could
encourage families to substitute liquid assets for vehicle assets). Given these potentially
offsetting effects, the overall hypothesized effect of many social program rules on specific types
of asset holdings is ambiguous (as shown in table 5).
Below we discuss our empirical findings on the relationships between specific state
program rules and liquid asset holdings, vehicle asset holdings, and net worth. The primary
results (summarized in table 6) suggest that (1) more generous restricted account asset limits and
IDA program rules are positively associated with liquid asset holdings; (2) more generous food
stamp vehicle asset limits and expanded categorical eligibility are positively associated with
vehicle asset holdings; (3) a more generous state EITC amount is negatively associated with
liquid asset holdings but the percentage of the state EITC that is refundable is positively
associated with liquid asset holdings; and (4) a more generous state minimum wage is positively
associated with liquid asset holdings, vehicle asset holdings, and net worth. 22 These findings are
most consistent with the asset test and income hypothesized effects.
Empirical Results, Liquid Asset Holdings
Of the 13 state program rules hypothesized to affect asset holdings, five rules have a statistically
significant relationship with liquid asset holdings. These rules are restricted account asset limit,
maximum amount qualified for match in an IDA account, the state EITC amount, the percentage
of the state EITC that is refundable, and the state minimum wage for federally covered
categories. In addition, all of the demographic controls and most of the economic controls are
important determinants of liquid assets holdings (table 7). Nearly all of these significant
variables have estimated coefficients that are in the hypothesized direction.
22

These general findings hold in an alternate specification that includes controls for state lifetime and intermittent
time limit rules.
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Table 5. Hypothesized Effects of State Program Rules on Asset Holding by Outcome

Program Rule Variable
AFDC/TANF
(1) Unrestricted asset limit
(2) Vehicle asset limit for recipients, at least one vehicle
(3) Restricted account asset limit
(4) Maximum monthly benefit for family of 3
Food Stamps
(1) FSP vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle
(2) Expanded categorical eligibility
IDA
(1) Maximum match rates
(2) Maximum amount qualified for match
(3) Eligibility beyond welfare recipients
Minimum Wage and EITC
(1) State EITC
(2) Percentage of state EITC refundable
(3) State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories
(4) State minimum wage for non-FLSA covered categories
T = Asset test effect
P = Precautionary savings effect
I = Income effect
S = Substitution effect (substitute one type of asset for another)
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Hypothesized Effect on
Liquid
Vehicle
Net
Assets
Assets
Worth
T P I S Overall
T P I S Overall
T P I S Overall
+/(+)
+/(+)
+/(+)
+ - (-)/(+) +/+ (+)
+/(-)/(+)
+/- + - (-)/(+)
+ - (-)/(+) +/- + + (+)
- +
- +
(+)/(-)
(+)/(-)
- - +
(+)/(-)
+ - (-)/(+)
+- +
(+)/(-)

+ + + (+)
+- +
(+)/(-)

+
(+)
+
(+)
+ - (+)/(-)

+ - (-)/(+)
+ - (-)/(+)
+ - (-)/(+)

- +
- +
+
+

(+)/(-)
(+)/(-)
(+)/(-)
(+)/(-)

+
+
+
+

(+)
(+)
(+)/(-)
(+)/(-)

+- +

(-)/(+)
(+)/(-)

+
(+)
+
(+)
+ - (+)/(-)
- +
- +
+
+

(+)/(-)
(+)/(-)
(+)/(-)
(+)/(-)

Table 6. Results Summary
Statistically Significant Relationships between State Rules and Asset Holding

Program Rule Variable
AFDC/TANF
(1) Unrestricted asset limit
(2) Vehicle asset limit for recipients, at least one vehicle
(3) Restricted account asset limit
(4) Maximum monthly benefit for family of 3
Food Stamps
(1) FSP vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle
(2) Expanded categorical eligibility
IDA
(1) Maximum match rates
(2) Maximum amount qualified for match
(3) Eligibility beyond welfare recipients
Minimum Wage and EITC
(1) State EITC
(2) Percentage of state EITC refundable
(3) State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories
(4) State minimum wage for non-FLSA covered categories
Note: Results based on primary models presented in tables 7-9.
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Relationship with
Liquid
Vehicle
Net
Assets
Assets
Worth

(+)

(-)

(+)
(+)

(+)
(-)
(+)/(-)

(+)

(-)
(+)
(+)

(-)
(+)

(+)

(+)

Table 7. The Effect of State Program Rules on Liquid Asset Holdings
of Low-Education Single Mothers and Families, Age 18–54, 1991–2003 SIPP

AFDC/TANF
Ln (unrestricted account asset limit) ($)
Vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle (0/1)
Restricted account asset limit ($10,000)
Ln (maximum monthly benefit for a family of 3) ($)
Food Stamps
Vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle (0/1)
Expanded categorical eligibility (0/1)
IDA
Maximum match rate ($)
Maximum amount qualified for match ($10,000)
Eligibility beyond welfare recipients (0/1)
EITC and Minimum Wage
State EITC ($100)
Percentage of state EITC refundable (0-1)
State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories ($)
State minimum wage for non-FLSA categories ($)
Demographic and Economic Controls
Age (years)
Age-squared (years-squared)/100
Black (0/1)
Hispanic (0/1)
Education less than high school (0/1)
Number of children in family (#)
Number of adults in family (#)
Metro area (0/1)
State unemployment rate (%)
State per-capita income ($/person)
State employment population ratio
Sample Size

Linear Probability
Ind. Liquid Assets > 0
Mothers
Families

Tobit
Ln (Liquid Assets)
Mothers
Families

-0.005
[0.017]
0.023
[0.020]
0.030
[0.018]
0.023
[0.092]

-0.003
[0.015]
0.014
[0.013]
0.025
[0.012]*
-0.035
[0.091]

0.019
[0.229]
0.403
[0.315]
0.538
[0.256]*
0.007
[1.434]

-0.034
[0.075]
0.125
[0.104]
0.261
[0.085]**
-0.316
[0.441]

-0.005
[0.020]
-0.011
[0.023]

0.007
[0.013]
0.007
[0.015]

-0.311
[0.330]
-0.230
[0.336]

0.071
[0.110]
0.092
[0.112]

0.008
[0.017]
0.010
[0.008]
-0.026
[0.039]

0.005
[0.013]
0.011
[0.005]*
-0.005
[0.031]

0.058
[0.191]
0.104
[0.147]
-0.225
[0.449]

0.058
[0.062]
0.089
[0.050]+
0.004
[0.147]

-0.008
[0.003]*
0.045
[0.029]
0.016
[0.023]
0.006
[0.013]

-0.002
[0.002]
0.023
[0.012]+
0.009
[0.016]
-0.002
[0.007]

-0.117
[0.056]*
1.003
[0.492]*
0.410
[0.279]
0.059
[0.219]

-0.022
[0.018]
0.214
[0.158]
0.222
[0.093]*
-0.047
[0.073]

0.022
[0.005]**
-0.021
[.007]**
-0.237
[0.014]**
-0.150
[0.031]**
-0.203
[0.013]**
-0.028
[0.006]**
0.020
[0.012]+
0.026
[0.015]+
0.019
[0.008]*
0.000
[0.000]+
0.713
[1.012]

0.026
[0.002]**
-0.028
[.003]**
-0.260
[0.011]**
-0.150
[0.017]**
-0.231
[0.006]**
-0.027
[0.003]**
0.104
[0.003]**
0.027
[0.009]**
0.018
[0.005]**
0.000
[0.000]
0.929
[0.434]*

0.478
[0.057]**
-0.541
[.083 ]**
-3.340
[0.154]**
-1.829
[0.182]**
-3.518
[0.142]**
-0.696
[0.065]**
0.298
[0.132]*
0.335
[0.167]*
0.253
[0.129]*
0.000
[0.000]*
6.594
[11.153]

0.410
[0.017]**
-0.445
[.023]**
-3.253
[0.059]**
-1.668
[0.062]**
-3.068
[0.049]**
-0.435
[0.017]**
1.405
[0.026]**
0.403
[0.051]**
0.203
[0.042]**
0.000
[0.000]**
10.445
[3.647]**

15,635

77,664

15,158

75,341

Note: **, *, and + indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. All
regressions weighted and include state and year fixed effects. All dollar values are in year 2000 dollars. Standard errors adjusted for
clustering by state in linear probability models. Sample size varies because tobit models exclude observations in top 3 percentiles of
liquid asset values.
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Welfare and Food Stamps: One specific state welfare program rule has a statistically significant
relationship with liquid asset holdings—the restricted account asset limit. The results suggest
that a more generous restricted account asset limit increases liquid asset holdings for both loweducation single mothers and low-education families, as might be expected because restricted
accounts (savings accounts earmarked for specific purposes such as IDAs) are typically held as
liquid assets. This finding is consistent with both the asset test and income effects hypotheses.
Restricted accounts often receive a match for dollars saved. The income from this match could
provide an incentive to increase savings in order to obtain the match and thus is hypothesized to
increase liquid asset holdings.
The estimated coefficients suggest that a $10,000 increase in the restricted account asset
limit increases the probability that a low-education family holds liquid assets by 2.5 percentage
points, holding all the other variables in the model constant (table 7, column 2). 23 This $10,000
increase may seem large to consider but is reflective of the variation in state policy. Typical state
restricted account asset limits vary from $0 to $10,000 to no limit (Rowe and Versteeg 2005,
120–21). To put the small magnitude of this relationship in context, consider that 58.9 percent of
low-education families hold liquid assets (table 2). Thus, a $10,000 increase in the restricted
account asset limit is associated with an increase from 58.9 to 61.4 percent in the percentage of
low-education families who hold liquid assets (an increase of about 4 percent). If only a small
fraction of the low-income (education) population has the option of joining an IDA program or
holding another type of restricted asset account, then the true magnitude of this relationship for
families may be larger than what we capture here.
An increase in the restricted account asset limit not only increases the likelihood loweducation families hold liquid assets, but also the amount of liquid assets they hold. The
estimated Tobit coefficients suggest that a $10,000 increase in the restricted account asset limit
increases the amount of liquid asset holdings by 17.9 percent for low-education single mothers
and 15.4 percent for low-education families (table 7, columns 3 and 4). 24
The empirical results suggest that liquid asset holdings are not significantly associated
with unrestricted asset limits, welfare benefit levels, vehicle exemptions, or expanded categorical
eligibility program rules.
Individual Development Accounts: The empirical results suggest that a more generous
maximum amount qualified for match in IDA programs is associated with increased liquid asset
23

Note that throughout this report, results are presented as percentage point changes for the liquid assets and vehicle
assets outcomes (linear probability models), percent change for the natural logarithm of amount of liquid assets and
vehicle equity outcomes (Tobit models), and as dollar changes for the net worth outcomes (OLS models).
24
To calculate marginal effects for the Tobit coefficients, the coefficients are multiplied by the cumulative normal
distribution function, which gives the probability of being above the limit (i.e., holding the asset). The cumulative
normal distribution is approximated by the fraction of the sample holding liquid assets (and owning a vehicle when
interpreting Tobit vehicle equity coefficients).
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holdings for low-education families. Increasing the maximum amount qualified for a match by
$10,000 is associated with a 1.1 percentage point increase in the probability that low-education
families hold liquid assets (table 7, column 2). It is also associated with a 5.2 percent increase in
the amount of liquid assets held by these families (table 7, column 4). These findings are
consistent with the income effect hypothesis. We find no statistically significant relationship
between two other IDA program rules—match rates and program eligibility beyond welfare
recipients—and liquid asset holdings.
EITC and Minimum Wage: We find mixed evidence of the relationship between the
state EITC and liquid asset holdings. Higher state EITC amounts are associated with reduced
liquid asset holdings. This relationship is consistent with the precautionary savings hypothesis,
where families are hypothesized to save less in anticipation of a tax refund. On the other hand,
we also find evidence that liquid asset holdings increase as the percentage of the state EITC that
is refundable increases. This relationship is consistent with the income effect hypothesis.
The results also provide limited evidence that the state minimum wage for federally
covered categories increases the amount of liquid assets held. The results suggest that a $1
increase in the minimum wage increases low-education families’ liquid asset holdings by 13.1
percent (table 7).
Demographic and Economic Controls: Liquid asset holdings are found to increase with
age until approximately the late 40s or early 50s and decrease with age thereafter for loweducation single mothers and families. This turning point is slightly earlier than in the general
population, where asset holdings tend to peak in the 55–64 age group and decline thereafter
(Carasso and McKernan forthcoming). The results also suggest that liquid asset holdings (1) are
lower for blacks and Hispanics than whites, (2) are lower for those with no high school degree
than those with a high school degree, (3) decrease with the number of children in the family and
increase with the number of adults in the family, and (4) are higher for families living in
metropolitan areas than non-metropolitan areas.
Empirical Results, Vehicle Ownership
Three of the 13 state program rules hypothesized to affect asset holdings have a statistically
significant relationship to vehicle ownership. Similar to the liquid asset holding models, all of the
demographic controls are important determinants of vehicle ownership as are some of the
economic controls.
Welfare and Food Stamps: The results suggest that none of the TANF program rules but
both Food Stamp Program rules have a statistically significantly relationship to vehicle asset
holdings (see table 8).
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Table 8. The Effect of State Program Rules on Vehicle Asset Holdings
of Low-Education Single Mothers and Families, Age 18–54, 1991–2003 SIPP

AFDC/TANF
Ln (unrestricted account asset limit) ($)
Vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle (0/1)
Restricted account asset limit ($10,000)
Ln (maximum monthly benefit for a family of 3) ($)
Food Stamps
Vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle (0/1)
Expanded categorical eligibility (0/1)
IDA
Maximum match rate ($)
Maximum amount qualified for match ($10,000)
Eligibility beyond welfare recipients (0/1)
EITC and Minimum Wage
State EITC ($100)
Percentage of state EITC refundable (0-1)
State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories ($)
State minimum wage for non-FLSA categories ($)
Demographic and Economic Controls
Age (years)
Age-squared (years-squared)/100
Black (0/1)
Hispanic (0/1)
Education less than high school (0/1)
Number of children in family (#)
Number of adults in family (#)
Metro area (0/1)
State unemployment rate (%)
State per-capita income ($/person)
State employment population ratio
Sample Size

Linear Probability
Ind. Owns Vehicle
Mothers
Families

Tobit
Ln (Vehicle Equity)
Mothers
Families

-0.005
[0.022]
-0.012
[0.025]
-0.003
[0.022]
0.104
[0.091]

-0.016
[0.011]
0.012
[0.011]
0.014
[0.010]
0.050
[0.037]

0.102
[0.251]
-0.163
[0.340]
0.181
[0.279]
1.080
[1.442]

-0.077
[0.071]
-0.058
[0.098]
0.098
[0.080]
0.644
[0.402]

0.039
[0.020]+
0.022
[0.019]

-0.010
[0.009]
0.018
[0.014]

0.854
[0.354]*
0.819
[0.364]*

-0.065
[0.103]
0.354
[0.104]**

0.002
[0.019]
-0.002
[0.010]
0.023
[0.040]

0.009
[0.006]
0.002
[0.004]
-0.013
[0.013]

-0.057
[0.211]
-0.097
[0.165]
0.239
[0.495]

-0.014
[0.059]
0.020
[0.047]
-0.049
[0.139]

-0.001
[0.004]
-0.007
[0.051]
0.021
[0.020]
0.005
[0.014]

-0.002
[0.002]
-0.004
[0.016]
0.011
[0.007]+
-0.006
[0.006]

-0.065
[0.065]
0.492
[0.567]
0.446
[0.308]
0.058
[0.233]

-0.009
[0.018]
0.093
[0.152]
0.149
[0.088]+
-0.049
[0.068]

0.058
[0.006]**
-0.069
[.008]**
-0.258
[0.016]**
-0.193
[0.042]**
-0.189
[0.010]**
-0.018
[0.006]**
0.045
[0.013]**
-0.024
[0.013]+
-0.005
[0.010]
0.000
[0.000]
-0.700
[0.807]

0.037
[0.002]**
-0.043
[.003]**
-0.264
[0.015]**
-0.113
[0.038]**
-0.156
[0.008]**
-0.012
[0.003]**
0.110
[0.004]**
-0.031
[0.010]**
-0.002
[0.004]
0.000
[0.000]
0.074
[0.351]

0.991
[0.063]**
-1.205
[.091]**
-3.492
[0.164]**
-2.721
[0.202]**
-2.820
[0.146]**
-0.315
[0.065]**
0.518
[0.143]**
-0.555
[0.177]**
-0.200
[0.140]
0.000
[0.000]
-12.119
[12.276]

0.443
[0.016]**
-0.511
[.021]**
-2.855
[0.054]**
-1.149
[0.058]**
-1.754
[0.044]**
-0.180
[0.016]**
1.213
[0.025]**
-0.366
[0.048]**
-0.104
[0.039]**
0.000
[0.000]
0.517
[3.450]

15,635

77,664

15,144

75,305

Note: **, *, and + indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. All
regressions weighted and include state and year fixed effects. All dollar values are in year 2000 dollars. Standard errors adjusted for
clustering by state in linear probability models. Sample size varies because tobit models exclude observations in top 3 percentiles of
vehicle equity values.
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Low-education single mothers and families in states with expanded categorical eligibility for the
Food Stamp Program have significantly higher vehicle equity than those who live in states
without expanded categorical eligibility. Our results suggest that expanded categorical eligibility
is associated with increased vehicle equity of 39.6 and 26.6 percent respectively for loweducation single mothers and families. The positive relationship between expanded categorical
eligibility and vehicle asset holdings is consistent with the hypothesized income effect—
additional program benefits help with the purchase or maintenance of a vehicle. These results are
also consistent with the hypothesized asset test effects. Expanded categorical eligibility results in
more lenient asset tests because families that receive TANF services (not just TANF cash
benefits) also qualify for food stamps, even if the Food Stamp Program has more stringent asset
tests. Many states use categorical eligibility as a backdoor way to ease vehicle asset limits. These
more lenient asset tests for recipients of TANF services are hypothesized to increase vehicle
asset holdings.
Also consistent with the asset test hypothesis, exempting at least one vehicle when
counting assets for Food Stamp Program eligibility is associated with a 3.9 percentage point
increase in vehicle ownership and 41.2 percent increase in vehicle equity for low-education
single mothers. While we find evidence that state Food Stamp Program vehicle exemptions
increase vehicle ownership, we find no evidence that exempting at least one vehicle from the
TANF program increases vehicle ownership, which is contrary to Sullivan (2006). We also find
no statistically significant evidence that the unrestricted asset limit, restricted account asset limit,
and maximum monthly benefit are related to vehicle ownership for low-education single mothers
or families.
Individual Development Accounts: The results provide no statistically significant
evidence state IDA program rules are related to vehicle ownership. Specifically, we find no
evidence that the maximum match rate, maximum amount qualified for match, or program
eligibility beyond welfare recipients are significantly associated with vehicle ownership. Since
IDA accounts generally cannot be used to purchase a vehicle, it is not surprising that IDA
program rules are not found to increase vehicle ownership or equity. If these IDA programs
cause families to shift resources from vehicles into savings, then we could find a negative
relationship.
EITC and Minimum Wage: The results suggest that a one dollar increase in the state
minimum wage for federally covered categories is associated with a 1.1 percentage point
increase in vehicle ownership and 11.2 percent increase in vehicle equity for low-education
families. This result is consistent with a positive income effect from an increased minimum
wage. We find no evidence that the EITC is related to vehicle ownership or equity.
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Demographic and Economic Controls: Similar to the models for liquid asset holdings,
all the demographic controls are statistically significant determinants of vehicle asset holdings in
the expected directions and the economic controls are weaker determinants of vehicle holdings.
Empirical Results, Net Worth
Asset tests measure liquid assets and vehicle ownership so there is likely to be a strong
relationship between asset tests and the level of these holdings. We also consider net worth
because asset-related program rules could cause families to shift their assets from one type of
asset (those considered in asset tests) to another type of asset (those not counted in asset tests,
such as homes), or could cause changes in debt levels (e.g., if a family borrows money to buy a
car in response to more lenient vehicle exemptions).
We examine two measures of net worth—net worth including home equity and net worth
excluding home equity. We measure net worth including home equity because for families who
own a home, the home is likely to be one of their most valuable assets. We measure net worth
excluding home equity because of potential measurement issues in trying to value homes. We
expect to see potentially larger effects of state program rules on net worth excluding home equity
because net worth excluding home equity is more likely to be affected by family saving and debt
behavior, while net worth including home equity is more likely to be driven by housing market
values, which are outside family control. Seven of the 13 state program rules hypothesized to
affect asset holdings have a statistically significantly relationship to net worth though not all of
these relationships appear robust (see table 9).
Welfare and Food Stamps: The results suggest that expanded categorical eligibility in
the Food Stamp Program increases the net worth (excluding home equity) of low-education
single mothers by $401. This finding is consistent with our finding that expanded categorical
eligibility increases vehicle equity, and is supported by the asset test and income effects
hypotheses. The similar increases in vehicle equity for low-education single mothers associated
with the food stamp vehicle asset limit and for low-education families associated with expanded
categorical eligibility did not translate into increased net worth.
We find some although limited evidence that more generous restricted asset account
limits are negatively associated with net worth. We find a significant negative relationship for
only low-income families’ net worth including home equity, so this unexpected finding is for
only one of the four regressions and for the population (families) less likely to be affected by
TANF policy.
Individual Development Accounts: The results provide some evidence that IDA program
rules are associated with net worth. The maximum match rate is positively associated with net
worth (both including and excluding home equity) for low-education single mothers. Each $1
increase in the match rate (say from 1-to-1 to 2-to-1) is associated with a $923 increase
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Table 9. The Effect of State Program Rules on Net Worth
of Low-Education Single Mothers and Families, Age 18–54, 1991–2003 SIPP
OLS
Net Worth (Incl. Home)
Mothers
Families
AFDC/TANF
Ln (unrestricted account asset limit) ($)
Vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle (0/1)
Restricted account asset limit ($10,000)
Ln (maximum monthly benefit for a family of 3) ($)
Food Stamps
Vehicle asset limit, at least one vehicle (0/1)
Expanded categorical eligibility (0/1)
IDA
Maximum match rate ($)
Maximum amount qualified for match ($10,000)
Eligibility beyond welfare recipients (0/1)
EITC and Minimum Wage
State EITC ($100)
Percentage of state EITC refundable (0-1)
State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories ($)
State minimum wage for non-FLSA categories ($)
Demographic and Economic Controls
Age (years)
Age-squared (years-squared)/100
Black (0/1)
Hispanic (0/1)
Education less than high school (0/1)
Number of children in family (#)
Number of adults in family (#)
Metro area (0/1)
State unemployment rate (%)
State per-capita income ($/person)
State employment population ratio
Sample Size

OLS
Net Worth (Excl. Home)
Mothers
Families

83.235
[572.425]
698.300
[554.448]
58.247
[481.887]
790.272
[2,155.237]

374.659
[875.387]
-8.868
[1,085.683]
-1467.249
[616.863]*
3375.655
[5,149.317]

-129.330
[153.100]
337.621
[204.335]
53.852
[156.300]
-180.010
[878.282]

21.290
[458.079]
-767.295
[532.082]
-255.392
[319.877]
-2860.396
[3,038.589]

-1003.734
[532.799]+
130.008
[509.791]

-679.250
[1,326.024]
-1935.735
[1,339.433]

-103.082
[179.768]
400.737
[171.744]*

523.147
[398.805]
-562.603
[550.317]

923.236
[366.248]*
80.520
[362.484]
-2435.173
[875.235]**

55.033
[789.064]
-743.448
[1,121.859]
1751.237
[1,435.979]

418.419
[166.492]*
-162.481
[89.171]+
-1116.35
[375.277]**

-158.881
[305.179]
-167.199
[204.149]
1547.555
[689.218]*

-175.713
[146.332]
1243.977
[1,085.700]
-723.728
[516.067]
-164.022
[334.910]

-31.936
[362.888]
-1904.144
[2,047.966]
1547.971
[1,259.613]
395.526
[848.403]

-33.051
[58.934]
387.571
[487.863]
-36.487
[222.914]
57.775
[139.045]

68.244
[83.896]
105.357
[455.972]
894.999
[444.097]*
-130.717
[385.812]

-1.843
[171.064]
522.337
[279.783]+
-4091.780
[513.409]**
-2698.324
[803.012]**
-2902.650
[372.118]**
-34.828
[133.748]
1684.587
[425.792]**
114.116
[552.452]
-113.282
[312.119]
0.867
[0.301]**
513.800
[22,441.499]

41.767
[174.031]
1631.693
[256.210]**
-18580.41
[1,291.941]**
-12155.63
[2,244.725]**
-12550.14
[769.951]**
707.296
[306.504]*
10693.570
[550.108]**
755.987
[1,001.636]
184.080
[487.584]
0.125
[0.654]
95699.975
[55,461.453]+

98.821
[37.301]*
-94.436
[55.516]+
-749.221
[110.482]**
-467.142
[166.676]**
-503.650
[69.953]**
-158.200
[33.896]**
304.064
[110.487]**
84.313
[128.294]
-72.342
[80.991]
0.133
[0.116]
5674.903
[9,079.566]

119.709
[98.165]
286.438
[150.866]+
-7010.925
[352.584]**
-4759.374
[633.731]**
-4587.349
[194.034]**
-124.761
[128.471]
2800.188
[218.325]**
131.794
[374.556]
-299.412
[284.619]
-0.147
[0.247]
20781.823
[22,233.837]

12,048

58,418

12,059

58,433

Note: **, *, and + indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. All regressions
weighted and include state and year fixed effects. All dollar values are in year 2000 dollars. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state.
Sample sizes vary because top and bottom three percentiles of net worth are dropped.
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in net worth including home equity and a $418 increase in net worth excluding home equity. An
increase in the maximum match qualified for a match is weakly negatively associated with a
decrease in net worth (excluding home equity) for low-education single mothers. Extending
eligibility beyond welfare recipients is related to a reduction of $2,435 and $1,116 in the net
worth (including and excluding home equity, respectively) of single mothers. This reduction in
the net worth of single mothers when eligibility is extended beyond welfare recipients might
result from IDA programs with a set amount of funds having fewer funds to target to the more
disadvantaged welfare population. Consistent with this hypothesis, extending eligibility beyond
welfare recipients is associated with an increase in net worth (excluding home equity) for loweducation families.
EITC and Minimum Wage: We also find evidence that a higher minimum wage for
federally covered categories is related to increases in the net worth of low-education families.
This finding is consistent with the hypothesized income effect. We find no evidence that the
EITC is related to net worth.
Empirical Results, Years since the Program Rule Was Implemented
To examine the timing of program rule changes, we estimate an alternate specification that
measures the number of years since the program rule was implemented (similar to Nam
forthcoming) rather than a precise measure of the rule. It may be that program participants and
potential participants understand only blunt measures of rules, such as whether a participant may
have a restricted asset account and not the amount she is allowed to hold in it. It may also be that
information on the rules takes time to filter down to participants and affect saving behavior. This
alternate specification captures blunt rule changes (such as whether restricted asset accounts are
available) and the timing of the blunt rule change (the number of years since it is available).
Some results from the years-since-program-rule-implemented specification are similar to
those from our primary specification—which captures more precise program rule measures—
while other results differ. TANF restricted asset account limits (as measured by the number of
years since restricted asset account limits became available in the state) are not significantly
related to liquid asset holdings, though the specific measure of the restricted account asset limit
was significantly positively related in the primary specification. The unrestricted asset limit (as
measured by years since the unrestricted asset limit was greater than $1,000 in the state) is
positively and statistically significantly associated with increases in liquid asset holdings while
the specific measure of the unrestricted asset limit was, in general, not positively or significantly
related to liquid asset holdings in the primary specification. IDA programs continue to be
significantly related to asset holdings and suggest that the number of years since a statesponsored IDA program became available in the state is associated with an increase in liquid
asset holdings. We find mixed results for the relationship between the years since at least one
vehicle was exempted in determining eligibility in the food stamp program but do find some
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evidence that both this variable and the years since expanded categorical eligibility was put in
place variable are associated with increased vehicle asset holdings. Detailed results are presented
in appendix tables A3–A5.
VIII. CONCLUSION

The results of this study suggest that various state program rules adopted since the mid-1990s,
especially those aimed at asset building, are positively related to low-education single mothers’
and families’ asset holdings. The analysis suggests that more lenient asset limits in means-tested
programs and more generous IDA program rules may have positive effects on asset holdings.
These results suggest that maintaining and expanding these programs may help promote asset
ownership among economically vulnerable populations.
Findings from the primary models suggest that not every asset-building program rule has
the same effect. For example, more lenient limits on restricted accounts are positively related to
liquid assets, while relaxed asset limits on unrestricted accounts have no significant relationship
with any type of asset holdings. More generous IDA rules, on the other hand, are positively
related to both liquid asset holdings and net worth. The different incentive structures and
program operations may have produced distinct outcomes: restrictions on withdrawals and
incentives which are built into IDA and restricted asset account limits may have motivated loweducation single mothers and families to save and helped them resist the temptation to spend.
Accordingly, asset-building program rules could be designed carefully to achieve policy goals.
Findings from an alternate specification that measures the years since the programs or
broad measures of more generous rules were implemented corroborate the IDA rule findings but
not the unrestricted versus restricted asset limit findings. This is the first study (known to the
authors) to look at the net relationships of restricted and unrestricted asset limits. The results are
suggestive, but not conclusive, that restricted account asset limits have different effects on asset
building than unrestricted asset limits do. Additional research on this topic could shed further
light on the role that unrestricted asset limits, restricted account asset limits, and IDA programs
play in asset building.
This study also shows that other non-asset related program rules have a relationship with
the asset holdings of low-education single mothers and families. For example, vehicle asset
limits and expanded categorical eligibility in the Food Stamp Program are positively related to
vehicle assets and net worth. These findings suggest that potential program interactions and
indirect effects of program rules on non-target areas are potentially important and could continue
to be considered in future research.
The mixed results of this study and previous studies of the effects of asset limits indicate
that further research on how people respond to the complex and contradictory incentive structure
presented by asset limits and asset-building programs would be helpful. This additional
30

knowledge would make a meaningful contribution to the policy discussion and could lead to
more effective asset policies for low-income people.
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Appendix Table A-1. A Selection of Reported Effects of Means-Tested Social Programs on Asset Accumulation
Author
Blank and
Ruggles (1996)

Gruber and
Yelowitz (1999)

Data

Sample/Study
Method
Population
1986 and
All spells of
Descriptive.
1987 Survey singleof Income
motherhood
and Program (currently
Participation unmarried women
(SIPP).
caring for
children).
1984 and
1993 SIPP
and the
Consumer
Expenditure
Survey
(CEX).

Hubbard, Skinner,
and Zeldes (1995)

Hurst and Ziliak
(2006)

Panel Study
of Income
Dynamics
(PSID).

Outcome
The percentage of
families ineligible for
welfare due to asset
holding.

All households
with household
head 18–64 and
no member over
64 (regressions
have more than
40,000
observations).

Instrumental variables Log of net worth and
regression. Control
log of consumption.
variables capture
gender, age, race,
education, marital
status, state and year
fixed effects, and stateyear interactions.

Potential and
actual social
program
recipients.

Theoretical and
dynamic programming
models.

281 at-risk female
household heads
with children,
plus comparison
groups.

Regression analysis
Change in household
with comparison
liquid assets between
groups and individual 1994 and 2001.
and state fixed effects.

Key Explanatory
Variables
N/A.

Current and future
Medicaid-eligible
dollars; dummy for
whether state has an
asset test interacted
with Medicaid
dollars.

Findings

Effect?

The percentage of months for which single mothers
N/A.
were ineligible increased from 57% (based only on
income eligibility) to 60.2% (both on income and asset
eligibilities).

Medicaid eligibility has a significant negative effect on
wealth and a strong positive association with
expenditures. Medicaid effects are much stronger with
an asset test. In 1993, Medicaid lowered eligible
households’ wealth by 16.3 percent.

Empirically:
Medicaid—yes
Medicaid asset
test—yes.

Theoretically:
Theoretically, social insurance programs with asset
tests discourage precautionary saving (this effect would program—yes
be present even in absence of asset test) and imply an asset test—yes.
implicit tax of 100 percent on wealth in the event of an
earnings downturn or large medical expense.

Changes in state
liquid asset limits,
vehicle limits, and
time limits between
1994–2001.

(continued on following page)
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Subjects’ savings have not responded economically or Empirically:
statistically to welfare reform induced changes in
AFDC/TANF asset
liquid asset limits, vehicle limits, or time limits. Low test—no
asset accumulation is not caused by asset limits but
liquid assets—no
may be because of the consumption floor guaranteed vehicle
by means-tested programs. A $1,000 increase in liquid ownership—yes.
assets limits increased asset ownership by no more than
$40. A $1,000 increase in asset limits increased car
ownership by 14.6 percent.

Appendix Table A-1 -- A Selection of Reported Effects of Means-Tested Social Programs on Asset Accumulation (continued)
Author

Data

Sample/Study
Method
Population
277 at-risk female Difference-inhousehold heads difference approach.
with children,
plus comparison
groups

Outcome

Nam
(forthcoming)

1994 and
2001 PSID.

The change in liquid
asset holding between
1994-2001, vehicle
ownership, and bank
account ownership.

Neumark and
Powers (1998)

1984 SIPP.

675 male
household heads
60–64 likely to be
eligible for SSI.

O'Brien (2006)

Qualitative
interview
data from a
convenient
sample.

8 TANF
Qualitative interview
participants in
analysis.
Alexandria, VA
and 10 welfare-towork program
participants in
Gaithersburg,
MD.

Powers (1998)

National
229 single
Longitudinal mothers in both
Survey of
1978 and 1983.
Youth,
Young
Women.

OLS regressions.

Sullivan (2006)

1992, 1993, 5,221 single
and 1996
mothers with high
SIPP.
school degrees or
less.

Probit regression for
Indicators for vehicle
vehicle ownership and ownership and liquid
OLS regression for
asset ownership.
vehicle equity.

Key Explanatory
Findings
Variables
State liquid asset
The earlier a state raised its countable asset limit, the
limit amount and
more likely welfare recipients were to accumulate
years since asset test liquid assets and to possess bank accounts.
changed.

Difference-inChange in net wealth, State supplemental
difference approach.
excluding housing,
SSI benefits.
Identifies the effects of between waves 4 and 7.
SSI from the
difference—between
states that do and do
not supplement
SSI—in the difference
in saving between
those likely and
unlikely to receive
SSI.

Effect?
Empirically:
AFDC/TANF years
since asset test
changed - yes.

High SSI benefits reduce saving among households
Empirically:
with heads approaching SSI eligibility who are likely SSI—yes
to end up participating in the program; a $100 increase
in SSI benefits decreases savings by $281.

TANF recipients'
decision about TANF
application.

N/A.

Qualitatively—yes.
(1) The existence of asset limits -- or, just as
importantly, the perception that these limits exist -negatively impact the savings behavior of TANF
recipients. (2) Nearly every individual feared having a
bank account would jeopardized their eligibility for
public assistance (p. 5). (3) Welfare recipients perceive
TANF eligibility policies to be more stringent than they
actually are. (4) The decision to apply for public
assistance is typically an option of last resort -- after
savings have dried up.

Change in total net
wealth (excluding
vehicles) between 1978
and 1983.

Changes in asset
limits and asset test
characteristics
between 1978 and
1983.

Between 1978 and 1984, subjects in most states saved Empirically:
approximately 25 cents for each $1 increase in AFDC AFDC asset
asset limits.
test—yes.

Indicators for
whether each state
has a vehicle limit,
real dollar value of
the vehicle limit, and
real dollar value of
total asset limit.

Asset restrictions do have an effect on vehicle assets,
but no effect on liquid assets. Subjects in a state with a
$1,500 vehicle asset exemption are 12 percent less
likely to own a car than subjects in a state with a full
vehicle exemption. Each $1,000 increase in vehicle
exemption results in a 2.3 percent increase in car
ownership.
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Empirically:
AFDC/TANF asset
test—yes
vehicle
ownership—yes
liquid assets—no.

Appendix Table A-2. A Selection of Reported Effects of IDAs on Asset Accumulation
Source

Data

Sample/Study Population

Hogan,Solheim,
Wolfgram, Nkosi,
and Rodrigues
(2004)

Qualitative data
25 participants in FAIM
from Family Assets (income <200 poverty)
for Independence in
Minnesota (FAIM)

Method

Outcome

Qualitative

Saving for asset
building (saving in
IDAs)

Key Explanatory
Variables
N/A.

Findings
(1) Despite continuous financial vulnerability (e.g. job
layoff and illness), majority of participants succeeded in
saving in IDAs. (2) 75% of participants saved $30 per
month (maximum monthly deposit) over a period of several
years. (3) Social supports from FAIM outreach staff or
fellow financial education class participants helped
participants stay in IDA programs, especially among those
without supports from family and friends. (4) Some
reported that they learned budgeting, record keeping and
planned saving skills from the required financial education
class.

Mills, Gale,
ADD Experiment
Patterson, and
(ADD-E) Data
Apostolov (2006)

Treatment group (N=412) or Desriptive, OLS, and
control group (N=428)
Probit.
randomly assigned from a
pool of qualified applicants
(income less than 150%
poverty line and currently
employed). Only those who
completed a survey at
enrollment and a 4-year
followup survey were
included.

Home ownership, home ADD participation
equity, business equity, (treatment vs.
and liquid assets.
control).

The IDA program: (1) Raised homeownership rates by
almost 10 percentage points over 4 years for black renters,
but reduced financial assets and business ownership. (2)
Had no effects on homeownership for white renters, but
their business equity rose. (3) Overall had no statistically
significant effect on net worth.

Office of
Community
Services, DHHS
(2004)

Asset For
Independence Act
(AFIA) Evaluation:
Program tracking.

All IDA accounts opened by Descriptive.
the end of the program's 4th
year. 12,252 TANF eligible
for with income <200% of
poverty level with net worth
<$10,000 were included.

Saving performance in N/A.
ADD acounts (savings
in ADD accounts;
matched withdrawal).

(1) Average IDA balance was $592 per account. (2)
Among 5,237 withdrawals from IDA accounts, 67% were
matched withdrawals.

Schreiner et al.
(2005)

American Dream
Demonstration
(ADD) Account
Monitoring Data.

Program participants at 14 Descriptive, Probit (the
probability of having at
ADD programs across the
United States (family income least $100 of net
deposit in ADD
of less than 200% of
account), and OLS
poverty).
(average monthly net
deposit).

Saving performance in
ADD acounts (savings
in ADD accounts and
whether participant
made a matched
withdrawal).

(1) About 53 % saved at least $100 in ADD account and
average net deposits were $537 (average monthly deposits
were $21). (2) About 35% made matched withdrawal and
the average value of matched withdrawals (including
matches) was $2711. (3) Income and welfare receipt
experience at the time of enrollment are not significantly
associated with the probability of saving at least $100 after
controlling demographic and other factors.(4) Program
characteristics (financial education and match rate) are
significantly associated with the probability of saving and
average monthly net deposit.

(continued on following page)
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N/A for descriptive
analysis.
Demographics,
income, welfare
experience, assets
and liabilities at the
time of enrollment,
and program
characteristics for
multivariate
analyses.

Appendix Table A-2 - A Selection of Reported Effects of IDAs on Asset Accumulation (continued)
Source

Data

Sample/Study Population

Method

Outcome

Shobe and Christy-Qualitative data
McMullin (2005) from a North
Carolina IDA
program

9 low-income African
American women

Qualitative

Saving for asset
building (saving in
IDAs)

Stegman and Faris American Dream
(2005)
Demonstration
(ADD) Account
Monitoring Data
and the Survey of
Consumer Finances
(SCF).

ADD program participants
and SCF households with
similar characteristics to
ADD enrollees

Simulation (Compare
actual savings in ADD
accounts and predicted
savings without ADD
using estimaton based
on the SCF sample.

ADD's saving effect
[(ADD balance predicted annualized
savings)*years in
ADD].
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Key Explanatory
Variables
N/A.

N/A.

Findings
(1) Participants believed that IDAs gave low-income
families opportunities for asset ownership, taught savings
and investments skills, provided personalized supports, and
helped them solve their credit problems. (2) A majority of
interviewees reported that they saved extra beyond their
IDA savings (maximum matchable savings=$1000).
(1)The median ADD participant has saved $117 more than
he/she would have saved without ADD participation under
an assumption of no shuffling (no transferred funds to
ADD accounts from other accounts). (2) ADD's saving
effect is larger among whites ($ 257 in median) than
Blacks ($56) and Hispanics ($175). (3) Under an
assumption of 50% of shuffling (50% of savings in other
accounts transferred to ADD accounts), the median saving
effect of ADD is $40.

Appendix Table A-3. The Effect of the Number of Years since State Program Rules Implemented on
Liquid Asset Holdings of Low-Education Single Mothers and Families, Age 18–54, 1991–2003 SIPP

AFDC/TANF
Years since unrestricted limit > $1,000
Years since at least one vehicle exempted
Years since restricted account asset limits available
Ln (maximum monthly benefit for a family of 3) ($)
Food Stamps
Years since at least one vehicle exempted
Years since expanded categorical eligibility in place
IDA
Years since IDAs available
EITC and Minimum Wage
State EITC ($100)
Percentage of state EITC refundable (0-1)
State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories ($)
State minimum wage for non-FLSA categories ($)
Sample Size

Linear Probability
Ind. Liquid Assets > 0
Mothers
Families

Tobit
Ln (Liquid Assets)
Mothers
Families

0.005
[0.005]
0.005
[0.005]
0.002
[0.004]
0.025
[0.085]

0.006
[0.003]+
0.003
[0.003]
0.001
[0.003]
-0.040
[0.096]

0.117
[0.065]+
0.084
[0.057]
0.004
[0.050]
-0.459
[1.391]

0.072
[0.021]**
0.027
[0.019]
0.000
[0.017]
-0.455
[0.431]

-0.002
[0.006]
-0.008
[0.012]

-0.002
[0.006]
0.001
[0.006]

-0.088
[0.127]
-0.197
[0.153]

-0.050
[0.046]
0.003
[0.050]

-0.001
[0.006]

0.006
[0.002]*

-0.011
[0.069]

0.077
[0.023]**

-0.008
[0.003]*
0.032
[0.028]
0.002
[0.025]
0.014
[0.014]

-0.001
[0.002]
0.014
[0.011]
0.000
[0.015]
0.004
[0.007]

-0.101
[0.056]+
0.661
[0.464]
0.215
[0.308]
0.228
[0.205]

-0.011
[0.018]
0.126
[0.150]
0.117
[0.103]
0.057
[0.068]

16,126

79,946

15,632

77,552

Note: **, *, and + indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. All
regressions weighted and include state and year fixed effects and all the same control variables shown in tables 6-8. All dollar values
are in year 2000 dollars. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state in linear probability models. Sample size varies because Tobit
models exclude observations in top 3 percentiles of liquid asset values.
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Appendix Table A-4. The Effect of the Number of Years since State Program Rules Implemented on
Vehicle Asset Holdings of Low-Education Single Mothers and Families, Age 18–54, 1991–2003 SIPP

AFDC/TANF
Years since unrestricted limit > $1,000
Years since at least one vehicle exempted
Years since restricted account asset limits available
Ln (maximum monthly benefit for a family of 3) ($)
Food Stamps
Years since at least one vehicle exempted
Years since expanded categorical eligibility in place
IDA
Years since IDAs available
EITC and Minimum Wage
State EITC ($100)
Percentage of state EITC refundable (0-1)
State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories ($)
State minimum wage for non-FLSA categories ($)
Sample Size

Linear Probability
Ind. Owns Vehicle
Mothers
Families

Tobit
Ln (Vehicle Equity)
Mothers
Families

0.006
[0.005]
-0.006
[0.005]
-0.006
[0.005]
0.019
[0.091]

0.001
[0.002]
0.001
[0.002]
0.000
[0.002]
0.035
[0.040]

0.140
[0.071]*
-0.080
[0.063]
-0.089
[0.054]
-0.150
[1.415]

0.009
[0.020]
-0.039
[0.018]*
0.010
[0.016]
0.669
[0.397]+

0.007
[0.008]
0.001
[0.008]

-0.008
[0.003]*
0.008
[0.006]

0.248
[0.140]+
0.161
[0.163]

-0.011
[0.043]
0.136
[0.047]**

0.008
[0.004]+

0.001
[0.003]

0.088
[0.075]

0.002
[0.022]

0.001
[0.004]
-0.029
[0.047]
0.020
[0.027]
0.004
[0.012]

-0.003
[0.002]+
-0.009
[0.014]
0.007
[0.008]
0.000
[0.007]

-0.031
[0.065]
0.060
[0.538]
0.322
[0.341]
-0.032
[0.223]

-0.015
[0.018]
0.076
[0.145]
0.099
[0.098]
-0.019
[0.064]

16,126

79,946

15,622

77,551

Note: **, *, and + indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. All
regressions weighted and include state and year fixed effects and all the same control variables shown in tables 6-8. All dollar values
are in year 2000 dollars. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state in linear probability models. Sample size varies because Tobit
models exclude observations in top 3 percentiles of vehicle equity values.
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Appendix Table A-5. The Effect of the Number of Years since State Program Rules Implemented on
Net Worth of Low-Education Single Mothers and Families, Age 18–54, 1991–2003 SIPP
OLS
Net Worth (Incl. Home)
Mothers
Families
AFDC/TANF
Years since unrestricted limit > $1,000
Years since at least one vehicle exempted
Years since restricted account asset limits available
Ln (maximum monthly benefit for a family of 3) ($)
Food Stamps
Years since at least one vehicle exempted
Years since expanded categorical eligibility in place
IDA
Years since IDAs available
EITC and Minimum Wage
State EITC ($100)
Percentage of state EITC refundable (0-1)
State minimum wage for FLSA covered categories ($)
State minimum wage for non-FLSA categories ($)
Sample Size

OLS
Net Worth (Excl. Home)
Mothers
Families

39.415
[110.132]
56.871
[112.276]
-208.872
[105.423]+
-1184.869
[2,480.576]

-119.859
[260.957]
311.429
[228.548]
-664.437
[225.764]**
3955.821
[5,904.362]

-37.755
[48.927]
-24.583
[28.883]
-62.127
[46.375]
-232.479
[647.066]

-64.708
[97.772]
-67.465
[94.778]
-47.318
[69.909]
-2005.675
[2,828.470]

-429.264
[241.194]+
18.334
[255.493]

-493.249
[488.580]
-334.684
[554.868]

18.707
[59.928]
124.412
[95.175]

266.732
[130.271]*
-45.878
[186.113]

-157.138
[127.507]

273.132
[234.935]

-31.199
[35.112]

232.677
[119.981]+

-178.564
[140.591]
498.854
[1,370.837]
-336.495
[605.204]
-165.479
[303.291]

93.694
[298.133]
-1650.928
[1,941.355]
2999.611
[1,494.072]+
922.522
[738.619]

-25.277
[52.703]
197.228
[447.923]
165.254
[340.985]
75.745
[106.221]

63.584
[71.747]
433.134
[484.404]
900.510
[527.808]+
60.509
[361.086]

12,496

60,524

12,507

60,536

Note: **, *, and + indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels, respectively. Standard errors in brackets. All regressions
weighted and include state and year fixed effects and all the same control variables shown in tables 6-8. All dollar values are in year 2000
dollars. Standard errors adjusted for clustering by state. Sample sizes vary because top and bottom three percentiles of net worth are dropped.
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XI. APPENDIX: PROGRAM RULES DATA DOCUMENTATION
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General Notes
Our analysis uses yearly program rule data. Since AFDC/TANF and Food Stamp Program
variables are available on a monthly basis, we use the July values of those variables for the entire
year. State IDA data come from annual sources.
AFDC/TANF Rules
1. Unrestricted Asset Limit for Recipients
Sources:

Welfare Rules Database (WRD)
Transfer Income Model (TRIM3), “Rules of Simulated Programs,”
http://trim.urban.org/T3Welcome.php

Assumptions:
• One adult and two children in family
• If the asset limit is broken down by liquid and illiquid asset limits, liquid asset
limit will be chosen.
• Unit does not include anyone age 60 or over.
• Recipient has signed a self-sufficiency pact (Missouri only).
• Recipient cooperates with case plan (Oregon JOBS/JOBS Plus only).
• No limit = highest capped value in a given year
2. Vehicle Asset Limit for Recipients, At Least One Vehicle Exempt
Sources:

Welfare Rules Database (WRD) and Urban Institute databases
First Annual TANF Report to Congress (August 1998), “Specific Provisions of
State Programs”

Values:

0/1 (no/yes)

3. Restricted Account Asset Limit for Recipients
Sources:

Welfare Rules Database (WRD)

Assumptions:
• One adult and two children in family
• New Mexico (1999-2003) does not restrict amounts saved for postsecondary
education or business capitalization, but caps the amount being saved for a
home purchase. We code this as no limit on restricted assets.
• Amounts listed as variable or determined by counties are treated as missing for
Colorado (1999-2003) and Florida (2002-2003).
• Wisconsin (2003) refers only to WISCAP IDA program, the only one of three
IDA programs for which data were available.
• No limit = highest capped value in a given year
4. Maximum Monthly Benefit for Family of Three
Sources:

Welfare Rules Database (WRD)
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Transfer Income Model (TRIM3), “Rules of Simulated Programs,”
http://trim.urban.org/T3Welcome.php
Assumption: One adult and two children in family

Note:

Values come from TRIM3 (1986-1995) and the WRD (1996-2000)

Food Stamp Program Rules

1. FSP Vehicle Asset Limit, At Least One Vehicle Exempt
Sources:

Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (2001-2005); FNS State Options
Reports 1 ; FNS waiver documentation

Values:

0/1 (no/yes)

Assumptions:
• Ignores special provisions for vehicles used to earn a living (for example,
taxicabs and delivery trucks).
• Monthly data: January 1996-June 2001, October 2001, February 2002, February
2003, January 2004; January 1996-September 2001 (Connecticut); February
1996-December 2003 (Montana). Missing values filled in with data from closest
month with nonmissing data.
Notes:

An option to apply vehicle rules from TANF or other low-income programs, if
they were more liberal than the standard FSP rules, was extended to all states as
of July 2001. On the basis of waiver documentation, three states are coded as
exempting one vehicle per unit before then: Connecticut (January 1996 through
September 2001), Michigan (January 1996 through September 1999), and
Montana (February 1996 through December 2003). All other states are coded as
zero for January 1996 through June 2001.

2. Expanded Categorical Eligibility
Sources:

FNS State Options Reports, Federal Register (2000), FNS “Letter to Regions on
Categorical Eligibility” (1999)

Values:

0/1 (no/yes)

Assumptions:
• Monthly data: January 1996-June 1999, April 2002, February 2003, October
2003, September 2004. Missing values filled in with data from closest month
with nonmissing data.

Notes:

1

all states coded as 0, January 1996-June 1999

FNS State Options reports refers to U.S. Department of Agriculture 2002c, 2003a, 2003b, and 2004b.

44

State IDA Program Rules
1. Maximum Match Rate
Assumption:
• No IDA = 0
2. Maximum Savings Amount Qualified for Match
Notes:

Over entire participation period.

Assumption:
• No IDA = 0
• No limit = highest capped value in a given year
3. Eligibility Beyond AFDC/TANF Recipients
Values:

0/1 (no/yes)

Assumption:
• No IDA = 0
Sources for all IDA variables:
CSD 2005 Survey on State IDA Programs.
CSD’s State IDA Policy Information
(http://gwbweb.wustl.edu/csd/policy/states.htm).
Welfare Rules Database (WRD).
TANF Annual Report (1999-2004): Specific Provisions of State Program.
CFED’s IDA directory from IDA network
(http://www.cfed.org/focus.m?parentid=31&siteid=374&id=374).
Notes:

A state IDA program is defined as a saving program that (1) matches savings
when withdrawn for pre-defined purposes; (2) is funded at least partially from
state government (programs funded solely with private foundations are
excluded); (3) is established through state legislation or administrative rulemaking; and (4) is actually implemented.

Other Policies
1. State EITC
Sources:

David Neumark and William Wascher (June 2001), “Using the EITC to Help
Poor Families: New Evidence and a Comparison with the Minimum Wage,”
National Tax Journal, Vol. 54 (2).
Nicholas Johnson (December 2001), Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “A
Hand Up: How State Earned Income Tax Credits Help Working Families
Escape Poverty in 2001,” http://www.cbpp.org/12-27-01sfp.pdf.
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Nicholas Johnson, Bob Zahradnik, and Joseph Llobrera (April 2003), ), Center
on Budget and Policy Priorities, “State Income Tax Burdens On Low-Income
Families In 2002,” http://www.cbpp.org/4-11-03sfp.htm.
Nicholas Johnson, Joseph Llobrera, and Bob Zahradnik (March 2003), Center on
Budget and Policy Priorities, “A Hand Up: How State Earned Income Tax
Credits Help Working Families Escape Poverty in 2003,”
http://www.cbpp.org/3-3-03sfp.htm.
State of Minnesota (January 2000), “The Federal Earned Income Tax Credit and
The Minnesota Working Family Credit.”
State of Minnesota (January 2004), “The Federal Earned Income Tax Credit and
The Minnesota Working Family Credit,”
http://archive.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2004/mandated/040054.pdf
State of Minnesota (February 2006), “The Federal Earned Income Tax Credit and
The Minnesota Working Family Credit,”
http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/pubs/feicwfc.pdf.
State of Minnesota (1999), Working Family Credit for Tax Year 1998,
http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/individ/prior_years/1998/algorithms/wfc2ca
lc.pdf
State of Minnesota (2000), Working Family Credit for Tax Year 1999,
http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/individ/prior_years/1999/algorithms/wfc.pdf
State of Minnesota (2001), Working Family Credit for Tax Year 2000,
http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/individ/prior_years/2000/algorithms/wfc.pdf
State of Minnesota (2002), Working Family Credit for Tax Year 2001,
http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/individ/prior_years/2001/algorithms/wfcalgo.pdf
State of Minnesota (2003), Working Family Credit for Tax Year 2002,
http://www.taxes.state.mn.us/individ/prior_years/2002/algorithms/ wfcalgo.pdf
State of Minnesota (2004), Working Family Credit for Tax Year 2003,
ttp://www.taxes.state.mn.us/taxes/individ/prior_years/2003/
algorithms/wfc_formula_03.pdf
Assumptions:
• Family of one adult and two or more qualifying children
• Maximum state EITC benefit (generally at end of phase-in range)
• Maryland’s EITC (1998-2003) is equal to the value of its non-refundable
EITC.
Notes:
Minnesota’s EITC (1999-2003) varies from other states as the state does not offer
a percentage of the Federal EITC. Minnesota offers an EITC composed of
varying percentages of earnings dependent on recipient income level.
2. Percentage of State EITC Refundable
Sources:

David Neumark and William Wascher (June 2001), “Using the EITC to Help
Poor Families: New Evidence and a Comparison with the Minimum Wage,”
National Tax Journal, Vol. 54 (2).
Nicholas Johnson (December 2001), Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, “A
Hand Up: How State Earned Income Tax Credits Help Working Families
Escape Poverty in 2001.”
State of Minnesota (January 2000), “The Federal Earned Income Tax Credit and
The Minnesota Working Family Credit.”
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Assumptions:
• Maryland (1998-2000) has both a refundable and non-refundable EITC. For
these observations, the variable is equal to the value of the refundable EITC
divided by the value of the non-refundable EITC.
3. Applicable Minimum Wage for Federally (FLSA) Covered Categories
Sources:

Notes:

U.S. Department of Labor, “History of Federal Minimum Wage Rates,”
http://www.dol.gov/esa/minwage/chart.htm.
Richard Nelson (1985-2001), Monthly Labor Review.
Council of State Governments, The Book of States, Vols. 27, 28, 30, 31, 33.
Labor Commission of Utah, “Minimum Wage,”
http://www.labor.state.ut.us/Utah_Antidiscrimination___Labo/Employment_St
andards/minwage/minwage.htm.
Jim Mosley (3 May 1990), St. Louis Post-Dispatch, “State Minimum Wage To
Take Effect Aug. 28,” pg 8A.
Larry Tye (2 April 1991), Boston Globe, “Minimum Wage Increases To $4.25,”
pg 3.
This wage is the higher of the state or federal minimum wage. In general, it is the
minimum wage covering the majority of workers in a state for the majority of the
month. Although not all state minimum wages cover FLSA-covered occupations,
it is assumed that if a state has a higher minimum wage than the federal level,
that state minimum wage is effective for FLSA-covered workers (which was the
case in 1999 and 2000).

4. State Minimum Wage for Non-FLSA Covered Categories
Sources:

Richard Nelson (1985-2001), Monthly Labor Review.
Council of State Governments, The Book of States, Vols. 27, 28, 30, 31, 33.
Labor Commission of Utah, “Minimum Wage,”
http://www.labor.state.ut.us/Utah_Antidiscrimination___Labo/Employment_
Standards/minwage/minwage.htm.
Wage and Hour Administration of Alaska, “Minimum Wage Standard and
Overtime Hours,” http://www.labor.state.ak.us/lss/whact.htm
Industrial Welfare Commission of California, “Summary of Interim Wage
Order—2000,”
http://www.dir.ca.gov/Iwc/SummaryInterimWageorder2000.html
Connecticut General Assembly, “Wages,”
http://www.cga.ct.gov/2001/pub/Chap558.htm
Office of Labor Law Enforcement of Delaware, “Minimum Wage,”
http://www.delcode.state.de.us/title19/c009/index.htm
Department of Employment Services of the District of Columbia, “Minimum
Wages,” http://www.does.dc.gov/does/cwp/view,a,1234,q,539346.asp
State Legislature of Iowa, “Iowa Code 2003: Section 91D.1,”
http://www.legis.state.ia.us/IACODE/2003/91D/1.html
Massachusetts General Laws, “Minimum Fair Wages,”
http://www.mass.gov/legis/laws/mgl/gl-151-toc.htm
State Legislature of Minnesota, “Labor Standards and Wages,”
http://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/stats/177/
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New Hampshire General Court, “Minimum Wage Law,”
http://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/NHTOC/NHTOC-XXIII-279.htm
Jim Mosley (3 May 1990), St. Louis Post-Dispatch, “State Minimum Wage To
Take Effect Aug. 28,” pg 8A.
Larry Tye (2 April 1991), Boston Globe, “Minimum Wage Increases To $4.25,”
pg 3.
Assumptions:
• A state minimum wage at or below the federal minimum wage for the majority
of a state’s state-month observations from 1986-2003 is assumed to cover NonFLSA workers in that state at all times. Otherwise, it is assumed to cover only
FLSA workers, in which case the Non-FLSA minimum wage is 0. This
assumption is based on the similarities between the exceptions to state
minimum wage coverage in states with a higher-than-federal minimum wage
and the exceptions to FLSA minimum wage coverage.
Notes:

The state minimum wage is often used to cover workers who are not covered by
the FLSA, 28 percent of workers in 1999. In most states (82 percent of our statemonth observations), the state minimum wage is less than or equal to the federal
minimum wage, suggesting non-FLSA coverage. For some states with a state
minimum wage higher than the federal minimum wage, the higher wage covers
FLSA workers only. The FLSA does not cover most workers in small businesses
or in businesses where no interstate commerce is involved, workers in seasonal
or recreational jobs, workers delivering newspapers or engaged in fishing
operations, many workers in private households, and executive, administrative,
and professional employees.
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